

LONDON RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP

London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LES LP) Major Incident Principles

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London Resilience Partnership LESLP Major Incident Principles

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Organisations participating in the review and maintenance of LESLP:

- British Transport Police (BTP)
- City of London Police (CoLP)
- Environment Agency
- Greater London Authority (GLA)
- Her Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG)
- London Ambulance Service (LAS)
- London Fire Brigade (LFB)
- London Local Authorities
- London Resilience Group (LRG)
- Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
- Military, Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)
- NHS England and NHS Improvement (London)
- UK Health Security Agency (UK HSA)
- Transport for London (TfL)
- Voluntary Sector

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LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities, and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

Version Control		
Version	Date	Change
11.0	2 Sept. 2021	Draft version for consultation following complete review undertaken in 2021. The final version is due to replace the previous published version 10.1 (July 2019).
11.1	14 Sept. 2021	Draft version with final amendments for review by LRPB on 16 th September 2021.
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11.4	26 Nov. 2021	Final version following proofread and resultant minor editing. Revised Annex J to reflect the latest publication of 'Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience. Fourth Edition, November 2021'.
11.5	15 Dec. 2021	Post-publication amendment to correct the wording of the title of Annex O (to 'On-Scene Coordination Meeting Template Agenda').

LESLP Major Incident Principles

This document provides information about the London Resilience Partnership's approach to a generic major incident, and additional capabilities needed to respond to specific incidents. It is designed to assist practitioners in the planning, training, and exercising stages of preparing for emergencies and to provide a reference document for use during incidents.

This document has been designed as general guidance to responders. The circumstances of each incident are different, and a flexible approach should be taken to the application of this guidance together with relevant national doctrine and relevant localised frameworks. As such, this document is not intended as a rigid, legally binding protocol.

This document conforms to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) 'Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework, Edition Three, 2021'

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Part A: Practical Guidance for Incident Commanders

This part of the document is designed to provide practical guidance for incident commanders, taking into account the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) and other relevant London Resilience Partnership frameworks (including the Strategic Co-ordination Protocol, Recovery Co-ordination Framework and the Humanitarian Assistance Framework).

The information in this part is structured around the five key JESIP principles for a joint response to an incident, rather than sequentially listed. Incident Commanders should have a good understanding of the content of this document.

Where appropriate, content directly mirrors that contained within JESIP joint doctrine. This part is not to be utilised in isolation; greater detail and context is contained within Part B and subsequent Annexes.

1. Definition and Declaration of Major Incidents

1.1 Definition of a Major Incident

A major incident is defined in national JESIP doctrine as:

“An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more of the emergency responder agencies.”

An “emergency responder agency” applies to all Category 1 and 2 responders (see Section 3) as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.

A major incident is beyond the scope of business as usual operations and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment, or national security.

It may involve only a single-agency response, but is likely to require a multi-agency response, even if that is the form of multi-agency support to the lead responder.

1.2 Declaration of a Major Incident

A major incident may be declared by one or more responder agency if the above definition is met. Once an agency has declared a major incident, it must be communicated to other agencies by the appropriate mechanism in the M/ETHANE format. The M/ETHANE message must contain the time of declaration, details of the declaring agency and clear rationale for the declaration.

In London, a declaration of a major incident for one agency does not necessarily mean that other partners will be required to implement special arrangements. Rather, each agency will review all declared major incidents and their potential consequences in order to provide an appropriate, proportionate and scalable response in accordance with their own procedures.

The decision to declare a major incident should ordinarily be made in local and operational context. There is no precise threshold or trigger. In London, the decision to declare a major incident may also be made at a strategic or tactical level (e.g. for pan-London incidents or those without a specified incident ground).

1.3 Stand Down and Handover to Recovery

Prior to stand down or handover following a major incident, the on-scene incident commanders should satisfy themselves that:

- The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.

- Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.
- If required, a handover of any ongoing actions or issues has been undertaken with the relevant local authority or other agency.

A joint decision to stand down a major incident declaration should then be made at the highest level of multi-agency co-ordination in place at that time (i.e. at the Forward Command Post, the Tactical Co-ordinating Group, or the Strategic Co-ordinating Group). The major incident stand down decision, and supporting rationale, should be recorded and passed to control rooms to cascade to all organisations notified of the initial major incident declaration.

Following the conclusion of the emergency response phase, formal handover to the Recovery Co-ordinating Group should take place (if one is required or has been established). For further information on the process, see the Recovery Phase in Part B Section 6 of this document or the LRP Recovery Co-ordination Framework.

2. JESIP Principles in Practice

2.1 Co-locate

There are many benefits of co-location, such as improved communication and better-shared situational awareness to support joint working. Co-location of responders should occur as soon as reasonably practicable.

With the use of technology co-location can be virtual, but physical co-location should remain a consideration, especially on scene. Some incidents may require physical co-location, for example, for security reasons.

At an operational level, the focal point is the rendezvous point (RVP) for resources or Forward Command Post (FCP) for relevant commanders and liaison officers.

Locations relevant to co-location are summarised below alongside their common map symbols.

2.1.1 Forward Command Post (FCP)

Lead Agency: On Scene Lead Agency



Forward
Command Post
(Police, Fire and
Ambulance)

During a major incident, respective incident commanders and liaison officers from responding agencies should co-locate at a jointly agreed single, clearly defined area/venue. This area/venue will be designated as the FCP. When deciding the site of an FCP, the following criteria should be considered:

- It should be in a safe location – ascertaining all present and potential hazards.
- Ideally, it should be adjacent to the approach route from the marshalling areas with parking for other emergency services command and support vehicles.
- It should be close enough to the scene to maintain control but divorced from actual working teams.
- It should be prominently signed and easy to find (it is recommended that the only blue flashing lights illuminated are those of the emergency services command vehicles).
- It should be secure from the media and any possible terrorist or other criminal activity.
- It should provide suitable space for On-Scene Incident Commander meetings to take place.

For incidents involving fire, chemical or hazardous materials, LFB advice should be sought to ensure the location chosen is safe. For terrorist incidents, the police will conduct a search of an area to ensure it is safe before designating it an FCP and additional safety measures may be implemented to protect responders gathering at those areas.

Once an FCP has been nominated by the lead agency, this should be communicated to other responders via control rooms.

2.1.2 Tabards

The operational and tactical commanders of each responder organisation should be easily identifiable at an incident. This is usually achieved by wearing role-specific tabards. There are exceptions, such as public order and public safety events, where coloured epaulettes and helmet markings are used.



Fire



Police



Ambulance



HM Coastguard



Local Authority (LALO)

2.1.3 Rendezvous Point (RVP)

Lead Agency: On Scene Lead Agency




This is separate from the FCP as requirements for an RVP differ. It is an area for resources at the scene to gather, when not directly deployed. This is where details of arriving resources should be logged, briefed, and deployed from. The RVP should be situated between the outer cordon and the traffic cordon.

When choosing a suitable RVP site, consideration should be given to the volume of vehicles (including size) and assets in attendance and the need for constant, unhindered access and egress to the scene and RVP. Similarly to an FCP, for terrorist incidents, the police may search an area before designating it as an RVP.

Should the location of the RVP need to be changed for any reason, the lead agency will notify each responding agency of the requirement and the new location.

2.1.4 Marshalling Area

Lead Agency: On Scene Lead Agency



A Marshalling Area (including Multi-Agency Marshalling Area, Strategic Holding Area [SHA] or Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area [MASHA]) is an area where additional resources, primarily emergency services and support services, may be held. It may also be used as a rest and briefing area for responders. Like an RVP, it must be suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles and support staff where resources can rest or standby while awaiting deployment to the incident.

2.2 Communicate

Communication at a major incident is key to ensuring an effective joint response and aids the development of shared situational awareness. The following must be adhered to:

- When any agency declares a major incident, they must communicate this to all other Category 1 and relevant/impacted Category 2 responders as soon as possible.
- Upon the declaration of a major incident, clear lines of communication must be established between control rooms of emergency services.
- A single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.
- A M/ETHANE message must be shared as soon as possible by the agency declaring the major incident.

2.2.1 M/ETHANE

The M/ETHANE mnemonic is an established format for responders and control rooms to share information related to a major incident.

A message in the M/ETHANE format must be sent from the scene to the control room, who should then share it with relevant responder organisations as soon as possible to ensure that joint situational awareness is quickly established. Each responder agency should submit their own M/ETHANE message to their control room to build shared situational awareness.

M	MAJOR INCIDENT	Has a major incident been declared? (Yes/No – If 'No', then complete ETHANE message)	Include the date and time of any declaration.
E	EXACT LOCATION	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.
T	TYPE OF INCIDENT	What kind of incident is it?	For example, flooding, fire, utility failure or disease outbreak.
H	HAZARDS	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	Consider the likelihood of a hazard and the potential severity of any impact.
A	ACCESS	What are the best routes for access and egress?	Include information on inaccessible routes and rendezvous points (RVPs). Remember that services need to be able to leave the scene as well as access it.
N	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?	Use an agreed classification system such as P1; P2; P3 and dead.
E	EMERGENCY SERVICES	Which, and how many, emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are already on-scene?	Consider whether the assets of wider emergency responders, such as local authorities or the voluntary sector, may be required.

2.2.2 Notification and Activation Process

Emergency Services Inter-Control Room – ESICTRL

- The ESICTRL talkgroup is a multi-agency interoperability talkgroup, continuously monitored by the control rooms of BTP, CoLP, MPS, LAS and LFB.
- The talkgroup is intended to enable fast time information sharing between those agencies in certain conditions, including when any agency declares a major incident.
- The declaration of, and information relating to, any major incident **must** include a M/ETHANE message.
- The use of the ESICTRL talkgroup does not negate the need or use for the tri-service phone call.

Tri-Service Phone Call

- A tri-service phone call is an agreed method of communication between the control rooms of the police, fire & rescue and ambulance services. It may be extended to BTP, CoLP and HM Coastguard if necessary.
- It is instigated when certain conditions are met, including the declaration of a major incident. It provides an early joint operating picture and assists in the interoperability of the emergency services in attendance.
- Any of the police, ambulance or fire & rescue services can initiate the tri-service call. When any service is notified of a major incident, they must inform the MPS control room of the incident and request initiation of the tri-service call.
- The notification will initially be made on the ESICTRL talkgroup while the tri-service call is set up.
- The MPS will be the default chair of the call and details of all attendees will be noted for recording purposes.
- The call will continue until agencies agree it is no longer required, but the following conditions must be met:
 - Shared situational awareness has been achieved.
 - A relevant M/ETHANE message has been circulated and received.

Tripartite Call

A strategic level tripartite call enables the London Resilience Partnership to decide how a major incident will be coordinated at the strategic level, including if it is necessary to activate a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). It takes place between the strategic leads for the declaring agency, the MPS and the London Resilience Group.

It is separate to the tri-service phone call (which takes place between emergency services control rooms) and is described in the London Strategic Co-ordination Protocol.

Declaration by an Agency without Access to ESICTRL

- If a major incident is declared by an agency that does not have access to the ESICTRL channel, or tri-service process, they must notify the London Resilience Group duty manager to discuss the appropriate partnership response.
- Where possible, the declaring agency can be assisted in cascading the declaration and associated M/ETHANE message via the ESICTRL channel by an agency that does have access.
- The major incident declaration and M/ETHANE report can also be cascaded by the London Resilience Group to members of the London Resilience Partnership. However, this is a supplementary means of cascade and does not replace the requirement for agencies to share the declaration and M/ETHANE report in fast time with other relevant Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

Notifying an Agency without Access to ESICTRL

- Not all partners that may declare or be involved in the response to a major incident will have access to the ESICTRL channel. Agencies that are required to respond who do not have access to the channel should have their respective control rooms notified via telephone as soon as possible.

- Where a direct link between CAD (or OnCall) and an agency's systems exists (e.g. Coastguard and EXP/MCA) they should be notified by an electronic message clearly stating that a major incident has been declared, provided with the remainder of the METHANE message and informed that the tri-service call is being established.
- Notification to the wider partnership of all Category 1 and 2 responders can be made via a secure web based multi-agency data sharing tool called the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS). This can also be used to generate a common operating picture (COP), however, LSAS is not continuously monitored and **should not** be used for operational communications.

Interoperability Talkgroups

A number of multi-agency interoperability talkgroups are accessible to all Airwave handsets and they can be used by incident commanders to share information to support decision making, reduce risk and increase safety.

These talkgroups are not subject to constant monitoring and **do not** replace the requirement for on-scene operational co-ordination meetings.

If one is required, it will need to be initiated via the following process:

- Following declaration of a major incident, an incident commander from one of the responding agencies can request an interoperability channel be established. This request must be made via their own agency control room.
- The control room receiving the request will notify the MPS, who will select and staff an appropriate talkgroup (considering accessibility from responding agencies).
- The talkgroup information should then be shared with responding agencies as appropriate. Incident commanders or representatives should begin to monitor and utilise this channel.

Common Terminology

Using terminology that either has different meanings for different people, or is simply not understood across different responders, is a potential barrier to interoperability.

Using common, agreed terminology and plain English will aid effective communication and interoperability. If there is any doubt about what is meant by a specific term, individuals should check and confirm that a common understanding has been established.

The [Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology](#) sets out definitions for common terminology, including terms in interoperability. There is also a set of [common map symbols for civil protection](#). These symbols are used throughout this document.

2.3 Coordinate

2.3.1 Identifying the Lead Agency


For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. Responding agencies, in consultation with each other, will assess the following factors:

- Type of incident
- Phase of the incident
- Requirement for specialist capabilities and investigation

The decision on which agency will take the lead should then be made and documented. This responsibility may be transferred by agreement, and the lead agency may change as the incident and response develops.

2.3.2 Levels of Command

There are three levels of multi-agency command that may be established in response to a major incident:



JESIP Tiers of Command

Agencies may set up their own internal command structures with differing terminology, but for an effective response, all agencies must work together at each level and participate in relevant co-ordinating groups.

Further information on strategic and tactical command can be found in Part B or Section 4 of the [Strategic Co-ordination Protocol](#).

2.3.3 Operational (On-Scene) Co-ordination

Lead Agency: On-Scene Lead Agency

Regular meetings should take place between on-scene incident commanders to ensure that any response is effectively co-ordinated. This will be mirrored at both Tactical and Strategic levels of command.

On-scene co-ordination meetings will take place at or close to the Forward Command Post.

Composition

The lead agency at the scene will chair on-scene co-ordination meetings. The group should initially define and periodically review the composition and chair of the group. This is to ensure that the right partner organisations and expertise are represented throughout the lifecycle of the group.

Representatives attending the operational co-ordination meetings should have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and deploy the resources of their respective agency.

On-scene incident commanders may appoint multi-agency sub-groups of incident commanders assigned to coordinate specific functions, tasks, or geographical locations.

An example composition of the on-scene co-ordination meeting can be found below.

Organisation	Representatives
On-Scene Lead Agency (chair)	Chair Secretariat (Minutes and Actions)
Police	Police Incident Commander Safety Advisor
Fire	Fire Incident Commander Fire Service Tactical Advisor (as needed) Scientific Advisor (as needed)
Ambulance	Ambulance Incident Commander National Interagency Liaison Officer (NILO) Medical Incident Officer (MIO) Emergency Planning Officer or CBRN Tactical Support Officer
HM Coastguard	Tactical Commander for Maritime Search & Rescue on the River Thames Maritime NILO
Local Authorities	Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) Technical Officers as requested
Transport Sector	Appropriate Operations Manager or Designated Tactical Lead Technical Officers as requested
Other	The above list is not prescriptive nor exhaustive, and invitations should be extended to all agencies involved in the operational response to the incident. A full list of responders can be found in Part B.

Frequency

The first meeting should take place **at the earliest opportunity**, with regular meetings scheduled accordingly thereafter. Meetings must be sufficiently far apart for organisations to discharge any actions arising at the previous meeting, but not too infrequent so as to cause a loss of shared situational awareness or joint understanding of risk. These meetings should continue until the response phase has concluded.

Location

Initial meetings should take place at the FCP. However, the location may change so meetings can take place at an alternative, more suitable premises throughout the response.

Recording Meetings and Joint Action Tracker

For on-scene co-ordination meetings, **a written recording must be taken**. Written records for meetings will, as a minimum, provide actions and decisions with rationale where stated in the meeting.

It will be the responsibility of the chairing agency to ensure adequate secretarial support is in place to support those functions. Incident Commanders should also appoint a loggist to track single agency decisions, actions and supporting rationale, but this does not negate having an appropriate joint record of on-scene co-ordination meetings.

Once completed, minutes and actions should be shared with those in attendance and any sitting TCG. Any recordings or decision logs generated must be retained in line with each organisations policy.

While there is no prescription to audio or visually record meetings, this may occur depending on which responders are present. This will be as a result of internal, single agency policies and equipment availability (e.g. body worn video cameras). Those who are recording should be aware that this may be unusual for certain responders and should notify attendees if they intend to record the meeting.

2.4 Joint Understanding of Risk

Different responder agencies may see, understand, and treat risks differently.

Each organisation should carry out their own risk assessments, then share the results so that they can plan control measures and contingencies together more effectively. Individual dynamic risk assessment findings may be used to develop any analytical risk assessment for the incident.

Commanders should build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce, or be controlled by any decisions made or subsequent actions taken.

2.5 Shared Situational Awareness

Shared situational awareness is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of the responder organisations.


Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. When establishing shared situational awareness Incident Commanders and control rooms should discuss the following points:

- Is it clear who the lead organisation is at this point? If so, who is it?
- What information and intelligence does each organisation hold at this point?
- What hazards and risks are known by each organisation at this point?
- What assets have been, or are being, deployed at this point and why?
- How will the required agencies continue communicating with each other?

Shared situational awareness will be developed and maintained by following the principles of co-locating, communicating and co-operating at the scene (including On-Scene co-ordination meetings), and by ensuring that M/ETHANE messages are shared and updated in a timely fashion from the scene and between control rooms.

3. Joint Decision Model

Incident commanders need to bring together available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make effective decisions. The joint decision model (JDM) assists this process.



Joint Decision Model (JDM)

3.1 Working Together, Saving Lives, Reducing Harm

The pentagon at the centre of the JDM reminds responders that all joint decisions should be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency – to save lives and reduce harm. This drives a people centred approach with a concern for public and responder wellbeing throughout the response.

This should be the most important consideration throughout the decision-making process.

3.2 Gather Information and Intelligence

At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant dimensions of an emergency straight away.

Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded or processed (e.g. M/ETHANE messages).

A deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between responder agencies, and responders should not assume that others will see or say things in the same way.

There may need to be a sustained effort to reach a common view of understanding of events, risks and implications.

Anyone providing sensitive information should also provide an understanding of how it can be used, shared and stored.

3.3 Assess Threat and Risk and Develop a Working Strategy

Responders should jointly assess the situation, including any specific threats, hazards and the risk of harm. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce, or be controlled by any decisions made and subsequent actions taken.

At any incident, each responder agency will have a unique insight into those risks.

By sharing what they know, responders can establish a common operating picture (COP). This allows for informed decision making on deployments and the risk control measures required. Time critical tasks should not be delayed by this process.

When developing a working strategy, responders should consider:

- What: Are the aims and objectives?
- Who by: Police, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service, other organisations?
- When: Timescales, deadlines and milestones?
- Where: Locations?
- Why: What is the rationale? Is it consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- How: Will these tasks be achieved?

3.4 Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures

Decision making in an emergency will focus on achieving the desired outcomes. Various constraints and considerations will shape how this is achieved.

Powers, policies and procedures may affect how individual agencies operate and co-operate to achieve the agreed aims and objectives, which should reflect their statutory duties.

A common understanding of relevant powers, policies and procedures is essential to ensure that the activities of responder agencies compliment, rather than compromise each other.

3.5 Identify Options and Contingencies

Responders should work together to evaluate the range of options and contingencies. Options or courses of actions should consider:

- Suitability: Does it fit with the strategic direction?
- Feasibility: Can it be done with the available resources?
- Acceptability: Is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

Whichever options are chosen, it is essential responders are clear on what they need to carry out. Procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic should also be clearly documented and shared.

Contingency arrangements should be put in place to address reasonably foreseeable events that may occur as a result of action taken or not taken.

3.6 Take Action and Review


Building shared situational awareness, setting direction, evaluating options and making decisions all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

Actions and the subsequent outcomes should be regularly reviewed. As information or intelligence becomes available or changes during the incident, responders should use the JDM to inform their decision making until the incident is resolved.

4. Scene and Incident Management

4.1 Scene Schematic

The diagram below shows the key locations at the scene of an incident, which are described in section 2 and below.



This diagram uses the Civil Protection Common Map Symbology (Cabinet Office, 2012).

4.2 Cordons

Lead Agency: Police

Safety Lead: London Fire Brigade

There are three cordons that could be established around an incident scene:

- Inner Cordon (denoted by red and white “Do Not Cross” tape).
 - Established to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working in the area.
 - Accessed through the Scene Access Control Point (SACP). This is where the Police and Fire Service will log those entering and leaving the cordon area.
 - The Fire Service is responsible for the safety management of all emergency service personnel and non-emergency service personnel deployed within the inner cordon.
 - Once the Fire Service no longer have a prime role at the incident, this responsibility will pass to the Police.
- Outer Cordon (denoted by blue and white “Do Not Cross” tape)
 - Established around the vicinity of an incident and encompassing the inner cordon.
 - Allows a safe area for emergency responders and partners to work and brief unimpeded by public or media.
 - Passage into the outer cordon is through the Access Control Point (ACP) where Police will log those accessing and leaving the outer cordon.
- Traffic Cordon (denoted by blue and white tape).
 - Supplementary to the outer cordon to control traffic access for emergency and other vehicles.
 - It is the responsibility of the police to establish but may be controlled by traffic management measures and equipment managed by Transport for London or Local Authorities.
 - It should, where possible, allow pedestrian access to homes, work and services.

4.3 Emergency Safety Evacuations

In circumstances where unsafe conditions for responders are detected that necessitate an emergency evacuation and it is not practical to pass the information via the command structure, an emergency evacuation may be implemented: this will normally be by the London Fire Brigade. The evacuation signal and withdrawal location will be detailed as part of the incident safety briefing. The evacuation signal will normally be short, sharp, repeated blasts on a whistle.

Where the LFB are not in attendance, an evacuation signal should be confirmed by the lead agency and understood by all partners entering the inner cordon until LFB arrive and are able to take over.

4.4 Health and Safety

Responsibility for health and safety rests with each organisation. The London Fire Brigade will provide professional advice on matters of safety at incidents involving fire or rescue. Consideration should be given to utilising expertise that may be available from industries directly involved in the incident e.g. Utility companies or transport providers. The Health and Safety Executive is also able to advise on safety matters.

5. Informing and Assisting those Affected by the Incident

5.1 Warning and Informing the Public

A well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency, whilst minimising the impact to the affected community. By informing the public (and staff) as best they can, all organisations will build their trust. This includes avoiding alarming the public unnecessarily.

The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 responders to warn and inform the public of emergencies and possible actions they may take to minimise the impact.

When London's strategic co-ordination arrangements are activated, the London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) can be activated to coordinate public communications.

Certain incidents (such as those involving hazardous materials or fumes) will require a dynamic assessment of information and timely dissemination to the public. The lead agency, together with other responding agencies, should consider whether dissemination of information or advice to the public is required, especially during the initial stages before the arrangements such as the LRCG has been stood up.

Accurate and up to date information is essential. A variety of methods may be used to communicate with the public including; mainstream and social media, local broadcast by emergency services public announcement systems, via frontline responders and through door-to-door communications. Consideration should be given to briefing responders with appropriate information/advice in case of questions from members of the public.

5.2 Casualty Bureau

Lead Agency: Police

Police may establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all deceased, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. This could be by taking telephone or online enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident, or reviewing information submitted via the Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP).

Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.

The Casualty Bureau will not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

5.3 Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP)

Lead Agency: Police

The MIPP website can be used to obtain information from both public and police sources in the event of a major investigation (e.g. murder) or major incident.

Where an incident requires the activation of Casualty Bureau, the public can use the MIPP to report the details of those they believe to be involved, and incident specific forms can be created to help capture information to assist the enquiry.

Passcode protected MIPP forms allow Police to submit information such as details of survivors first accounts and other information. This includes Investigative Triage Forms for completion at Hospitals or Survivor Reception Centres (SuRCs). Where appropriate and necessary, partner agencies may assist members of the public in completing these forms as an alternative to being interviewed by a police officer.

5.4 Bronze Hospital Co-ordinator and Sub-Bronze Hospital

As part of the response and investigation, police will deploy to hospitals receiving casualties. They will obtain casualty details to enable the information to be added to Casualty Bureau records, implement the set forensic strategy and prevent any public order issues that may arise.

The police officer overseeing the police resources at a hospital will be referred to as the Sub-Bronze Hospital. The attendance of local authority staff at A&E to support bereaved or anxious relatives should be negotiated with the Sub-Bronze Hospital and A&E managers.

During larger or complex incidents where casualties are admitted at multiple hospitals, the police may activate a Bronze Hospital Co-ordinator to manage all the individual Sub-Bronze Hospitals.

5.5 Casualty Management

Lead Agency: London Ambulance Service

5.5.1 Triage Sieve

- A triage sieve is the name given when LAS will systematically work through patients to triage and allocate them one of five triage tags. During this process, the LAS will not get involved in substantive treatment of any patient. The tags are as follows:
 - Immediate Life Threatening – Red Priority 1
 - Delayed Requires Hospital – Yellow Priority 2
 - Minor Injured – Green Priority 3
 - Expectant (non-survivable) – Red 1 with fold down blue corner
 - Deceased – Black with the wording “dead”

5.5.2 Casualty Clearing Station

- A casualty clearing station will be a temporary structure or building within the outer cordon. It is where casualties are further triaged. Enhanced assessment and treatment will take place to stabilise the casualty prior to transport. An advanced paramedic will take the role of Casualty Clearing Clinical Lead.



5.5.3 Dealing with Fatalities

- As part of the triage sieve, clinicians will assess and carry out recognition of life extinct. These patients will be appropriately tagged and left in situ to ensure continuity of any subsequent forensic process. Should it be necessary to move a fatality to gain access or treat a live patient, the original location of the deceased will be recorded on the triage tag.
- If local mortuary arrangements are insufficient to cope with the number of deceased victims, emergency arrangements must be activated. Some larger public mortuaries in London are designated disaster mortuaries. They can be enhanced or adapted to cope with an increased number of deceased victims and the associated investigative activity.

The single source of information relating to casualty figures is NHS England. The Coroner leads on fatality figures (disseminated via/in conjunction with the lead police service for the incident).

5.6 Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance is activity aimed at addressing the needs of people affected by emergencies; the provision of practical, psychological and social aftercare and support in the short, medium and long term.

In the response phase, providing immediate shelter and safety is a priority, enabling further support and assistance activities to follow.

Depending on the size and scale of the incident, it may be necessary to establish one or more of the following to assist those impacted directly or indirectly as a result:

5.6.1 Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC)

Lead Agency: Police (supported by Local Authority)

- An SuRC is a secure area in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid; evidence and information may be gathered from the survivors in respect of the incident.
- A temporary but secure area between the outer and inner cordon.
- The local authority may assist in finding a suitable venue and can be present at the SuRC to provide care and practical assistance to survivors. In order to do this, they **must** be informed as soon as possible once the decision to establish an SuRC has been made.
- Survivors who do not require hospital treatment should be directed or taken to an SuRC where they can be met by police and other services.
- Survivors can obtain information and support in the immediate aftermath of the incident, be documented by police and provide accounts/witness statements.



5.6.2 Rest Centre

Lead Agency: Local Authority

- A Rest Centre serves as a place of shelter and safety for those who have been evacuated from their home, work or other place and are unable to return, but are uninjured and not directly affected by the incident.
- Attendees will be provided practical and wellbeing support by the local authority and supporting agencies until able to return home or alternative accommodation.
- Police will attend official Rest Centres, to gather information from survivors and witnesses.
- Some unofficial Rest Centres may be set up (for example by local communities or charities) outside of the incident response structure. Agencies should work together to identify the existence and location of all Rest Centres/places of shelter ensuring appropriate support and co-ordination amongst them.
- Police may also attend unofficial Rest Centres, to gather information about survivors and witnesses.



5.6.3 Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC)

Lead Agency: Police (supported by Local Authority)

- Where demand warrants, consideration should be given to establishing a secure and comfortable area where friends and relatives of casualties and missing persons can obtain information and gather away from media attention or those less impacted by the emergency (i.e. in the Rest Centre).
- It should be located outside the outer cordon, but in proximity to the SuRC. They may also be set up outside hospitals to provide a focal point for families to attend.
- Agencies whose advice and assistance may be required (voluntary sector or local authorities) should be in attendance to provide access to practical and emotional support.
- Police can record missing person enquiries and gather information that may assist enquires as well as reuniting friends and families with loved ones.



6. Other Considerations

6.1 Record Keeping

Lead Agency: All

Each agency should have processes in place to ensure appropriate records are kept during incidents and that these records are collated and stored appropriately, in case they are required for any subsequent investigations, inquests or inquiries.

6.2 Debriefing

Lead Agency: Incident Lead

It is important to capture lessons while events are fresh in the minds of those involved. For this reason, a joint “hot de-brief” should be held by Incident Commanders as soon as practicable after the incident.

Formal multi-agency de-briefs, arranged by the lead agency and undertaken by trained and impartial de-briefers, may be held later, ideally within three weeks of the incident concluding. They should involve a full range of responders and control room staff to ensure lessons are identified and captured from every aspect of the response. This may be replicated across all levels of co-ordination as appropriate.

All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures. In London, multi-agency debriefs must be held with good practice and recommendations for learning shared with relevant agencies and Joint Organisational Learning.


Part B: Supplementary Information

7. Stages of a Major Incident

Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- Initial response.
- Consolidation phase.
- Recovery phase.
- Restoration of normality.

An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the subsequent hearings, may be overlaid on one or more stages.



7.1 Initial Response Phase

Initially there will be a scalable response from relevant responder agencies. Relevant responders will vary depending on the nature of the incident.

Whilst any member of a Category 1 or 2 responder can declare a major incident, in practice, a joint decision is often made between the initial attending emergency services.

Communications in the initial stages are likely to be via the ESICTRL channel between control rooms, or by telephone with those who do not have access.

7.2 Consolidation Phase

The consolidation phase will normally involve all of the emergency services in attendance as they progress the initial response phase. Additional agencies that were not present at the initial response may be invited to the operational or tactical co-ordination meetings to advise or respond based on their specific expertise and response capabilities (e.g. local authority structural engineers in the event of damaged buildings).

7.3 Recovery Phase

Recovery is an integral part of the emergency management process. It can be defined as: *'The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency'*. This process is distinct from, but will usually overlap with, the response phase (defined as *'the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency'*).

The recovery process is typically led by the Local Authority. Local recovery arrangements can be triggered by; a decision at an SCG, a Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG, see Section 10.7), or outside of an SCG at the request of strategic partner, such as those locally (e.g. Council Gold) or otherwise (e.g. a utility company). Regional recovery arrangements can be triggered by a decision at a London Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) to form a London Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG), at the request of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) or any SCG representative. The decision should be based on an assessment that regional co-ordination, support, or oversight will add benefit to local recovery actions.

An SCG or LSPG is not a pre-requisite to triggering and forming an RCG, although this is the most likely route.

The recovery process should begin during the initial response phase and if the incident requires a Recovery Co-ordination Group (RCG) this should be formed as soon as possible to influence the response strategy in terms of looking ahead to recovery arrangements.

Over time, the balance of the response will naturally lean more towards recovery. When the response phase ends, responsibility of co-ordinating strategic activity will be formally handed over to the RCG. This is likely to be chaired and led by a Local Authority.

See [London Recovery Co-ordination Framework](#) for further information.

7.4 Restoration of Normality

The Recovery Co-ordination Group will continue to meet until there is no longer a need for regular multi-agency co-ordination. Local recovery groups and individual agencies can continue to address remaining issues, or they may be subsumed into existing work programs or governance structures.

It should be noted that local recovery can be a long-term process that may continue for several months or years.

8. Emergency Responder Agencies

Civil resilience in the UK is underpinned by the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) (CCA). Part 1 sets out the local arrangements for civil protection, and Part 2 the emergency powers. In Part 1 of the Act, local responder organisations are divided into two categories, these are Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders.

Category 1 responders include the emergency services, local authorities and NHS bodies. Category 2 responders include the Health & Safety Executive, utility and transport companies. These are examples and not an exhaustive list. Non-categorised responders include the military and voluntary organisations; they are not bound by the CCA.

8.1 Category 1 Responders

- British Transport Police - BTP
- City of London Police - CoLP
- Environment Agency - EA
- Greater London Authority - GLA
- Hospital Trusts with Accident and Emergency functions
- London Ambulance Service - LAS
- London Fire Brigade - LFB
- Local Authorities - LA
- London Port Health Authority - LPHA
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency - MCA (HM Coastguard)
- Metropolitan Police Service - MPS
- NHS England and NHS Improvement (London)
- UK Health Security Agency – UK HSA (formerly Public Health England)

8.2 Category 2 Responders

- Electricity distributors and transmitters
- Gas distributors
- Telephone service providers (fixed and mobile)
- Water and sewerage undertakers
- Airport operators
- Harbour authorities
- National Highways (formerly Highways England)
- Network Rail
- Train operating companies (passenger and freight)
- Transport for London (including London Underground) - TfL
- Health and Safety Executive - HSE
- Clinical Commissioning Groups - CCG

8.3 Other Responders

In addition to Category 1 and 2 responders, voluntary organisations often provide a significant role in the response to a major incident. See Annex M for further information.

The military may also provide assistance to the civil authorities in responding to a major incident operating under Military Aid to Civil Authorities policy and procedures. See Annex J for further information.

8.4 Roles and Responsibilities

8.4.1 Fire & Rescue Service

The primary areas of London Fire Brigade responsibility at a major incident are:

- The saving of life through search and rescue
- Firefighting and fire prevention
- Rendering humanitarian services
- Detection, identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment
- Provision of qualified scientific advice in relation to HAZMAT (hazardous materials) incidents via their scientific advisors
- Salvage and damage control
- Safety management within the inner cordon
- To maintain emergency service cover throughout the LFB area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time

8.4.2 Police Services

The primary areas of police service responsibility at a major incident are:

- The saving of life together with the other emergency services
- The co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations responding to an incident
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable
- The collection and distribution of casualty information
- The identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty's (HM) Coroner
- The prevention of crime
- Family liaison
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken

8.4.3 Ambulance Service

The primary areas of London Ambulance Service responsibility at a major incident are:

- To save life together with the other emergency services
- To provide treatment, stabilisation and care of casualties at the scene
- To provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources
- To establish an effective triage sieve and sort system, prioritising the needs and evacuation requirements of the injured and establish a safe location for casualty clearing
- To provide a focal point at the incident for all National Health Service (NHS) and other medical resources
- To nominate and alert receiving hospitals for the injured and inform other agencies
- To arrange the most appropriate means of transporting the injured to hospitals
- To maintain emergency cover throughout the LAS area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time
- To act as a portal into the wider health services including UK Health Security Agency (formerly Public Health England).

8.4.4 HM Coastguard

HM Coastguard is responsible for initiation and co-ordination of Civil Maritime Search & Rescue within the UK Search & Rescue region. This includes mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the UK. This is a statutory duty under the Coastguard Act 1925.

HM Coastguard's area of responsibility includes the River Thames and during a major incident involving the River Thames, HM Coastguard is the lead agency for Civil Maritime Search & Rescue. HM Coastguard will work with other agencies and organisations using best endeavours to deliver their response capability.

The primary areas of responsibility are to:

- Save life
- Initiate and co-ordinate assets
- Identify appropriate Casualty Landing Points

8.4.5 Local Authorities

Local authorities can be contacted 24/7 to deploy a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) to the scene and to provide support to major incidents based on their day-to-day responsibilities and operations, including but not limited to:

- Social care and psychosocial support
- Professional physical resources
- Provision of reception centres
- Rehousing and accommodation needs
- Welfare and financial needs
- Technical and engineering advice (e.g. structural engineering and building control)
- Highways and transport services

- Public health and environmental services
- Recovery Management

8.4.6 London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)

A London Local Authority Chief Executive is pre-nominated as London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) providing 24/7 cover. In a regional incident, London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London's 32 Boroughs and the City of London Corporation. LLAG will normally represent the collective interests of London local authorities at a Strategic Co-ordinating Group meeting, alongside direct representation by the strategic representative of the directly affected borough or boroughs where applicable.

Where LLAG is activated in response to an incident, the London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre (LLACC) is established to provide co-ordination between LLAG and the 33 Borough Emergency Control Centres (BECC).

8.4.7 London Resilience Group (LRG)

The London Resilience Group supports the work of the London Resilience Partnership in preparing for, and responding to emergencies. The role of London Resilience Group in response to an emergency is:

- To support effective Partnership strategic co-ordination arrangements:
 - To facilitate shared situational awareness through the production of a Common Operating Picture (COP)
 - To provide the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) secretariat function in conjunction with the lead responder agency
 - To provide strategic advice about London Resilience Partnership response capabilities to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group
- To support effective co-ordination of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) arrangements
 - To facilitate shared situational awareness across LLAG and the 33 local authorities
 - To deliver the London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre (LLACC) function in support of LLAG and the 33 local authorities
 - To provide strategic advice to LLAG

8.4.8 Inter-Agency Resources

Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.

Visits made by VIPs to the scene and to injured survivors may place additional strain on the operation in terms of security, public order, increased media attention and interruption to normal rescue functions. The Police Strategic Commander will be responsible for planning and liaison relating to these visits.

8.4.9 Liaison Officers

National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are security vetted, trained and identifiable emergency responders from the LFB, LAS, HM Coastguard and British Transport Police, who may operate in either a command, tactical advisor or service specific role. They can support pre-

planned or spontaneous operations at strategic, tactical and operational levels including facilitating interoperable working with partner agencies.

Local authorities are able to deploy a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) to act as the local authority point of contact at the scene of a major incident. The LALO will liaise with the other responding agencies and attend on scene coordination meetings to represent the local authority. The LALO will pass information and requests from other responding agencies to the local authority incident response structure, the local authority tactical officer or BECC if activated. The LALO will also coordinate local authority activities at the scene (see section 8.4.5).

9. Organisational Control Rooms

9.1 Police

Initial command and control will be via individual emergency service control rooms, monitored by the respective control room processes. In the event of an escalation of the incident requiring a more coordinated approach, the MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) is available to be activated to support the Police response to major/significant incident.

9.1.1 Special Operations Room (SOR)

The Special Operations Room (SOR) provides command and control for major incidents, terrorist incidents, disorder and demonstrations. The room has consoles for use by LAS, LFB, BTP and CoLP liaison officers through which they have access to all the radio and their own electronic call/despatch systems. Additional consoles are available for other agencies (e.g. local authorities, military).

The National Police Air Service helicopter can provide live and recorded video of an incident anywhere in London which may be downloaded if required.

9.2 Fire

LFB Control, at the London Operations Centre (LOC), is responsible for the taking and management of emergency calls from the public and partner agencies. The control team have a number of specialist resources, both locally and nationally, at their disposal which can be mobilised to incidents as part of a pre-determined attendance or at the request of Incident Commanders in order to bring an incident to a safe conclusion.

LFB control holds the responsibility for notifying and mobilising all LFB assets and senior officers to incidents, it is a vital communications hub, requesting the services of other Category 1 and 2 responders when appropriate.

LFB control room supervisors will monitor various radio channels 24/7 alongside colleagues from the LAS and MPS to be able to share real time information in the event a major incident is declared, or a significant incident is taking place. The LOC will also mobilise and host the officer cadre and support staff when the Brigade Co-ordination Centre (BCC) is set up for all Fire major incidents that will remotely support an incident but also ensure business as usual response across the LFB.

9.3 Ambulance

Control Services are an integral part of any major incident management system. The initial call will be received by Control Services which will dispatch appropriate LAS resources. The early identification of significant incidents or potential major incidents is of paramount importance.

9.3.1 Ambulance Specialist Operations Centre (SOC)

The SOC is the dedicated incident management facility within the control suite which supports and manages the command function during incidents and other operations. The SOC is responsible for:

- Providing a central co-ordination of incident activity.
- Providing a liaison function for the tactical commander & tactical advisor.
- Deployment of resources to the incident.
- Nomination and declaration of receiving hospitals.
- Allocating ambulances their destination hospital ensuring even distribution.

- Communication with hospitals and external organisations.
- Primary logging duties.
- Paging instruction procedures.
- Management of Airwave talk groups and communication.
- Facilitating requests of additional resources, equipment and personnel to scene.

Whilst the LAS and MPS are able to send and receive electronic messages from each other's CAD systems, they are unable to interrogate the other's system.

9.4 Local Authority Co-ordination

9.4.1 Local Authority Borough Emergency Control Centre(s)

At the local level, the Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) is the hub of the local authority response, from which a local authority will monitor or manage a borough's incident response. Following the notification of a major incident, the responding borough, neighbouring borough, or all London boroughs depending on the scale or impact of the incident may set up a BECC. The LALO is the local authorities representative and point of contact at the scene of a (major) incident. The LALO will pass information and requests from other responding agencies to the BECC. All LA BECCs have access to Airwave radios and shared multi agency talkgroups.

A BECC may respond at one of three levels:

1. Monitoring.
2. Information sharing and communications.
3. Incident response and co-ordination.

A BECC will deliver three primary functions when operational:

- Operational co-ordination of the council's response.
- Situational awareness of the incident overall.
- Management and administration of the BECC.

9.5 HM Coastguard

HM Coastguard have a control room in London. This is one of a network across the UK and coordinates all civil maritime search and rescue for the tidal River Thames. It is supported by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), which can provide network assistance in response to an incident. JRCC has the capability to take overall control of HM Coastguard co-ordination if necessary. HM Coastguard has a CAD link to the MPS and also uses Airwave and VHF radio systems.

9.6 Transport

The Network Rail National Operations Centre (NOC) maintains an overview of the management of rail incidents across each individually managed Route, and this is co-located with the London Underground Control Centre (LUCC), Arriva Rail London (ARL) control and the BTP Force Control Room for London (FCRL).

Where an incident has pan-London implications, it may be necessary to coordinate activity across TfL and other transport providers. This is in addition to the normal liaison between the various TfL command structures. The Palestra Event Liaison Facility (PELF) may be activated as a Transport Cell to coordinate the response to the impacts across the transport network.

9.7 Radio Communications

9.7.1 Emergency Services Network (ESN)

All London emergency services and many other agencies, including HM Coastguard and London local authorities have Airwave radios with a joint communications capability. In addition, Airwave is used nationally by BTP, and the system extends into London Underground stations.

Should additional Airwave capacity be required in the event of an emergency underground the MPS Communications Command (MO12) can invoke Operation Tunnel Sound – the utilisation of ERVs (Emergency Response Vehicles) to provide additional capability.

These radio channels are intended for command use only by the respective service for liaison purposes or to pass critical information in a life-threatening situation and not for general inter-service use. Their use needs to be specifically requested by tactical commanders through the MPS Communications Command (MO12) utilising Operation Cavern.

The Airwave system is a digitally encrypted radio system that has a very high level of security. However, other systems (fax, mobile telephony, or unencrypted radio transmissions etc.) may be vulnerable to interception and this should be borne in mind when wording transmissions, including cellular telephone conversations containing sensitive information.

9.7.2 LFB Ground Radios

In addition to Airwave radios carried on appliances and by managers, all LFB operational staff are issued with incident ground radios that operate on UHF. They are compatible with 'leaky feeder' systems installed in London Underground stations and other designated locations.

9.7.3 Communications Tactical Advisors

Local Airwave networks only have a finite capacity, and during major incidents or events with deployment of high numbers of responders, there can be added pressure on local sites making that part of the network less effective.

A Communications Tactical Advisor acts as a strategic, tactical or operational resource to be deployed at pre-planned or spontaneous events and incidents and is responsible for the provision of appropriate, valid and reasonable advice in relation to radio communications.

They are able to provide support and advice to commanders and control rooms on matters of Airwave capacity, capability and contingency planning for possible outages.

10. Co-ordinating Groups

10.1 Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

For incidents that are more significant, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be formed. Initially the group is likely to comprise emergency service, Local Authority and London Resilience Group strategic representatives, and other agencies as required.

The role of the SCG is to coordinate the response at the strategic level; setting strategy, determining priorities, and making decisions to ensure:

- Shared situational awareness
- A sufficiency of support and resources to the incident
- The wider implications and impacts of the incident are considered
- Statutory obligations are fulfilled (e.g. to 'warn and inform' the public)
- Suitable liaison with Central Government and other bodies.

The group will normally meet remote from the scene with suitable communications and meeting facilities but may also meet by teleconference.

If the circumstances require a prolonged and significant input from all agencies, it may be appropriate to convene full strategic representation from the London Resilience Partnership at a Strategic Co-ordination Centre (see [Strategic Coordination Protocol](#) for further information).

10.2 Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)

Tactical Commanders are responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by their Strategic Commander. They should make every effort to achieve the closest co-ordination with counterparts in other services by meeting regularly and sharing information at the earliest opportunity.

Tactical Commanders should be located where they can most effectively undertake their responsibilities and should remain detached from the immediate response activities. There will be occasions when tactical co-ordination is best-achieved remote from the scene, such as in multiple simultaneous incidents or where a command structure is already in place for a pre-planned event / operation e.g. a major incident during a sporting event.

10.3 Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG)

The purpose of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) is:

- The strategic decision-making body for the recovery phase, able to give the broad overview and represent each agency's interests and statutory responsibilities.
- Provides visible and strong leadership during the recovery phase.
- Takes advice from any established sub-groups, decides the strategy and ensures implementation of the strategy and the rebuilding of public confidence.
- Ensures the co-ordination and delivery of consistent messages to the public and media.

10.4 Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)

A Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG) may be established and led by the local authority to coordinate all humanitarian assistance activity.

A HASG will focus on providing direction to the overall humanitarian response, in line with the strategic direction from an SCG. In practice this will be:

- Understanding who has been affected and how, and what their needs are now, and how they may develop.
- Initiating actions to meet people's needs and monitoring outcomes.
- Co-ordinating between agencies to provide a coherent response.
- Transitioning between phases.
- Ensuring appropriate communications are in place, as part of the wider multi-agency communications response to the incident.

All relevant agencies will be expected to be represented to ensure effective delivery of support and care to those affected by the emergency.

10.5 London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)

The London Resilience Communication Group brings together representatives from different organisations communications teams to plan for and co-ordinate the communication response to a major incident or significant event impacting on London.

The LRCG aims to coordinate strategic public communications in support of the emergency response, including statements to the media and establishing a media centre if required.

Any agency can notify their respective communications department who, where necessary, will activate the group. Further information can be found in the London Resilience Communication Group Framework.

10.6 Emergency Co-ordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA) and Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

ECOSA is the mechanism to provide coordinated scientific advice to the responders at a scene. It is coordinated by the UK Health Security Agency and includes the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) with other agencies included as required.

ECOSA has been created to fulfil the requirement for the provision of immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice to the police, fire and rescue service, ambulance service and public health responders across the UK at what might be a CBRN incident. This scientific advice will be provided up until the time a STAC is formed wherein it will then stand down and hand over to STAC.

The role of the STAC is to ensure timely coordinated scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency.

10.7 Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG)

A Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG), formerly known as a local SCG, may be formed at the borough level where thought by local organisations to be required to provide a mechanism for strategic level engagement and information sharing. This may include local political engagement.

There will be no formal coordination or information sharing link between an LSPG and the Forward Command Post or Tactical Coordinating Group.

11. ANNEXES

Annex A – Casualty clearance

Categories

1. The care and identification of casualties is a primary responsibility of the emergency services at a major incident. Victims fall into one of four categories:
 - Survivors (uninjured)
 - Casualties (injured)
 - Evacuees
 - Dead
2. They may be witnesses/victims or even suspects and carry evidence or hazards on their clothing, particularly in terrorist incidents.

Survivors (Uninjured)

3. The Survivors will have been involved in the incident but will not necessarily want or require medical attention. They will usually be removed from the hazard or hazard zone by London Fire Brigade or Ambulance Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) personnel. Once these people have been removed from any hazards and processed through a triage sieve by the LAS, they must be directed towards the Police for collation of details and witness statements.
4. Police will need to collate their details for the benefit of the Casualty Bureau as well as the investigation. This can be conducted at the Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC).
5. Responders need to consider and attempt to collate witness details of those who refuse to attend a SuRC or who are attempting to leave the scene prior to supplying any information.

Casualties (Injured)

6. The Casualties need to be rescued from the scene and cared for as quickly and safely as possible by the rescuers. LFB staff engaged in this role are trained to a high level of immediate emergency care and firefighters at incidents who provide care for casualties must continue to do so until an appropriate suitably qualified medical professional arrives on scene and is ready to take over. Ambulance paramedics and technicians then need to be able to administer the appropriate pre-hospital treatment before the patients are taken to the receiving hospitals. As the ambulance teams go forward, they will take equipment for use by emergency responders at the incident site.
7. The LAS aim at any multiple casualty incident is to enable the highest possible survival rate. They will need to deliver the right patient to the right place at the right time so that they receive the optimum treatment. Triage is a dynamic continuous process. The LAS have a responsibility to ensure that at every stage of the incident patients are continually assessed to ensure that changes in the condition of the patient are reflected in the patient's triage category.
8. The triage system is a "physiological system" which relies on changes in vital signs as a result of an injury or illness rather than an "anatomical system" that relies on decisions being made on what injuries can be seen. Where an experienced clinician is using the

triage system, knowledge of the clinical condition that is based on an anatomical injury may be used to upgrade a triage category.

9. During an incident the LAS will use two levels of triage: “triage sieve” and “triage sort”. Both systems use algorithms to determine which priority group a patient falls into. The priority groups are as follows:

Priority Description and Colour

- Immediate Life Threatening: Red Priority 1
- Delayed Requires Hospital: Yellow Priority 2
- Minor Injured: Green Priority 3
- Expectant (Non-survivable): Red 1 with fold down Blue Corner
- Deceased: Black with the wording ‘Dead’

Triage sieve

10. This triage sieve quickly sorts out casualties into priority groups. Using the algorithm card, the LAS will systematically work through the patients, triaging and labelling them. The LAS will not get involved in substantive patient treatment during a triage sieve, this will include the looking for any signs of life.

Triage sort

11. On the arrival of further resources, patients are moved to a place of safety, usually the casualty clearing station. At this location, they can be re-triaged using a triage sort process. This process is a more thorough clinical triage than the sieve.
12. The same triage card is used throughout the sieve and sort process updating patients triage category by refolding the card as necessary.

Paediatric triage

13. During most major incidents, the LAS triage paediatrics using the adult triage sieve – this over-prioritises but is a safe option. During a multiple casualty incident, involving mainly paediatric patients the LAS will instigate the use of the paediatric triage process. The system uses similar algorithms to that of the adult triage tape.

Expectant category

14. The expectant category is only used with the authority of the LAS Strategic Commander in liaison with the Medical Director, and with advice from the Emergency Planning Advisor. This situation would arise when there are such large numbers of patients that, the ability of the LAS to respond to the clinical needs of every individual and potentially un-survivable injuries, would be to the detriment of other patients.
15. Expectant patients must be triage labelled as “priority 1” which is red in colour though with a blue flash corner folded back from the rear of the priority 1 card.
16. An appropriate doctor would decide the decision to what casualties fall into the category.

Casualty clearing station and ambulance loading point

17. The casualty clearing station is a place of relative safety to which casualties are conveyed from the incident site. Triage sort, assessment, treatment and stabilisation is carried out by LAS staff together with any mobile medical teams on scene at the station. The LAS Bronze Clearing Officer and a doctor (Casualty Clearing Station Medical Lead) coordinate the casualty clearing station.
18. A suitable area or building between the inner and outer cordons near to the site should be identified for use as the casualty clearing station, or a temporary structure may be assembled.
19. Once enough resources have arrived on scene it is vital that patient documentation starts within the casualty clearing station.
20. The DVI Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM) should be notified of any deceased in the Casualty Clearing station so that they may be recovered by the DVI Team to the Dedicated Disaster Mortuary (DDM) via the Holding Audit Area (HAA).

Hospital

21. Once the patient arrives at the hospital, the patient will be re-triaged by hospital staff. The ambulance crew must ensure that they report their arrival with both Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and the Ambulance Liaison Officer (ALO) at the hospital.

Labelling and documentation

22. Documentation of patients must start as soon as possible. Triage labels must be attached to patients in the initial stages of the incident even if there is no opportunity to collect personal details. Details of each patient should be collected as soon as they enter the casualty clearing station/area.
23. In the early stages of an incident, it may not always be possible for ambulance crews to record the usual details of patients. However, on route to the hospital any details about the patient that can be obtained will be entered onto the electronic Patient Care Record (ePCR) so that a record of patient movement and patient care (however minimal) is recorded. Ambulances should not be delayed at the scene in order to obtain personal details of individual casualties, which will be obtained by the police at the Receiving Hospitals. In all circumstances, the triage label must be completed.
24. Any patient that has been assessed and discharged at scene will also have an ePCR completed.
25. Police service instructions refer to the attaching of nationally and recommended identification labels to deceased persons. Ambulance service personnel should note that these identity and evidential labels are NOT to be used in place of the medical triage labels.
26. Police should liaise with the LAS to maintain a count of all persons processed. The LAS will provide the following casualty details;
 - Number of casualties treated and discharged from scene
 - Number of casualties conveyed and to which hospitals
27. Police officers will be deployed to the casualty departments of these hospitals to provide documentation teams, assist with forensic issues and security advice.

Casualty Clearing Station - Activated by Ambulance Bronze Clearing CCS

28. The Casualty Clearing Station is a site of relative safety, usually sited inside the outer cordon.
29. It is where casualties are triaged, assessed and stabilised. Ambulance staff are supported by additional team of mobile medics. Clinical lead will be a nominated doctor or advanced paramedic. This can be a temporary structure or building.
30. Casualties are triaged to ensure they receive the most appropriate treatment prior to their removal to hospital. Two triage processes are used to assess priority.
31. Once sufficient Ambulance resources are present patient documentation will commence.
32. Police will send a Casualty Clearance officer to this location to ensure patients non-clinical details are obtained, this is part of the identification process.

Annex B – Dealing with fatalities

Deceased and Human Remains

1. As part of the triage sieve the London Ambulance Service (LAS) clinicians will assess and carry out any recognition of life extinct (ROLE) as required. These patients will then be appropriately triage tagged and left in situ to ensure continuity of the forensic process. More information about managing mass fatalities is available in the [London Resilience Mass Fatalities Framework](#).

If it is essential to move a deceased person to gain access/treat a live patient, the original location of the deceased will be recorded on their triage tag.

Doctors from London Air Ambulance (LAA) will be able to pronounce life extinct.

The Coroner

2. Her Majesty's Coroner is responsible for establishing who has died as well as how, when and where they died. Where multiple deaths occur, the police will investigate and report to HM Coroner, this is in addition to police responsibilities regarding any criminal investigation. There are eight coronial districts within the Greater London area; these are made up of clusters of London boroughs with the exception of the City of London which stands alone. Jurisdiction will normally sit with the coronial district 'where the body lies'.
3. Jurisdiction may, by agreement, be transferred between coroners in some circumstances. For a large incident that affects more than one coronial district, it may be agreed to appoint a Lead Coroner. This would require agreement between the coroners concerned as well as funding support from the London boroughs concerned.
4. It is important that HM Coroner's Office is consulted and included in the decision-making around the response to an incident involving fatalities. HM Coroner may want to assess the disaster scene along with other nominated persons such as a Pathologist.

Police Senior Identification Manager

5. Police commanders will appoint a senior investigator as the Senior Identification Manager (SIM), this manager will hold a nationally recognised qualification in management of the investigation regarding disaster victim identification (DVI). The SIM will liaise with HM Coroner and be responsible for disaster victim identification investigation at the scene; investigation within the mortuary; investigation at Casualty Bureau and Family Liaison investigation. The SIM will work closely with the Senior Investigating Officer appointed to manage any criminal investigation.

Scene Investigation

6. Police commanders will deploy a suitably skilled Disaster Scene Coordinator to coordinate disaster victim recovery, forensic, search and other related investigative activity at the disaster scene. The title Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM) is used for this role in existing national guidance. Bomb Scene Manager or Counter Terrorism Scene Manager are titles used in counter terrorism. The SERM will be a police manager who has passed the national SERM course to safely manage specialist activity and the ability to work closely with other agencies. Other agencies would include the London Fire Brigade and statutory investigative bodies. such as the Health and Safety Executive and Rail, Marine or Air Accident Investigation Branch.

Mortuaries

7. If local arrangements are insufficient to cope with the number of deceased victims, emergency arrangements must be activated. Some of the larger public mortuaries in London have been identified as Designated Disaster Mortuaries. These mortuaries can be enhanced or adapted to cope with an increased number of deceased victims and the associated investigative activity.
8. Temporary structures may be used to enhance existing mortuaries or to build a stand-alone temporary mortuary. A temporary mortuary may be utilised for storage or, if assessed as necessary, be capable of hosting investigative post-mortem autopsy examinations. Sites where a large temporary mortuary could be constructed have been identified and are regularly reviewed.

Disaster Victim Identification

9. London has a cadre of police officers and forensic practitioners who have received additional training in disaster victim identification (DVI). London contributes to a national DVI cadre coordinated by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC–UK DVI). Mutual aid can be provided to London through the UK DVI Coordinator, based within the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC).
10. Personnel are trained in disaster victim recovery, using the Disaster Victim Recovery Booklet to assign a unique number to the deceased victim or to a body part recovered. The booklet also records initial evidence such as the location that the deceased victim was found; forensic issues; whether the body appears to be complete; plus, relevant times for continuity. Disaster Victim Recovery Booklets are held by Metropolitan, City of London and British Transport Police. An emergency online version is also available to download from the INTERPOL website. Disaster victim recovery operations may require support from London Fire Brigade, with regard to safety and specialist equipment to aid access to deceased victims.
11. The DVI cadre are also trained in mortuary procedures to recover post-mortem data and exhibits. Mortuary investigation involves the use of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms which are also available via the INTERPOL website. These forms which should always be printed on pink paper are used to record post-mortem data such as physical features; clothing and jewellery etc.
12. A Police Mortuary Operations Coordinator will be appointed to manage police investigative activity at the mortuary, working closely with the Local Authority Mortuary Manager.
13. There must be lines of communication from the scene and mortuary with Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

Forensic Investigation

14. A Home Office approved Pathologist will be appointed as a key contributor to the investigation and to provide evidence to HM Coroner regarding the cause of death. If the deaths are as a result of a criminal act or negligence a Forensic Pathologist will be appointed. Sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms are specific to pathology. Pathologists will be assisted by Anatomical Pathology Technicians. Other forensic specialists that may be utilised in the mortuary are: Forensic Odontologists; Forensic Anthropologists; Police Crime Scene Managers and Fingerprint Practitioners. There are sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms specific to odontology (dental information); fingerprints and DNA.

Family Liaison Investigation

15. Ante-mortem data is information relating to the missing person provided by next of kin etc. This information is collected by Family Liaison Officers who have received specific training in investigation which results in the completion of the INTERPOL DVI Ante Mortem Forms, which should always be printed on yellow paper. These forms are virtually identical to the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms, with sections for clothing, jewellery, pathology, odontology, fingerprints and DNA etc.
16. The Family Liaison Officer may require support from forensic specialists in order to recover or check ante mortem data such as dental records, fingerprints or DNA for comparison.
17. Family Liaison Officers are tasked by a Family Liaison Coordinator working from Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

Reconciliation Investigation

18. Post-mortem data is compared to ante-mortem data in order to establish identification. Deceased disaster victims will normally be identified using the United Kingdom and INTERPOL Disaster Victim Identification Primary Identification Standards. This means that where possible and subject to the approval of HM Coroner, deceased victims should be identified by comparison of dental information; DNA or fingerprints. In some circumstances a unique medical or physical feature may provide reliable evidence of identity, such as a uniquely numbered medical implant. This information should be supported by Secondary Identifiers such as marks, scars or tattoos, plus supporting information such as clothing, jewellery or where appropriate circumstantial evidence. The DVI cadre includes Reconciliation Investigators who with the support of forensic specialists will prepare a detailed report for HM Coroner regarding evidence of identity. This evidence will be presented at an inquest or a specially arranged Identification Commission chaired by HM Coroner.

Annex C – Humanitarian Assistance

1. People need timely, practical support with a sympathetic and understanding approach to enable them to recover both practically and psychologically. Their needs are individual and varied and change significantly over time. The road to recovery is both personal and individual, but also collective and shared by communities.
2. Humanitarian assistance coordination and delivery can vary in size and scale. People's needs change as time goes on and therefore the response will need to adapt. There is no single answer as to what should be provided; there is a variety of options and decisions will need to be made at the time of the incident, based on the circumstances.
3. In larger incidents, it is likely that a Humanitarian Assistance Lead Officer (HALO) will be appointed via the local authority to lead the humanitarian assistance response. A multi-agency Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG) may also be established to plan and deliver the humanitarian assistance activities.

Evacuations and Displaced People

4. Some emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. Further details can be found in the London Mass Evacuation Framework. Care must be taken to ensure that evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger.
5. Evacuation is usually undertaken on the advice of the LFB tactical commander. In some circumstances, personnel from all services may have to assist in carrying it out. A suitable evacuation assembly point will need to be established and emergency centres established. For further information please see the Humanitarian Assistance Framework.
6. Personnel from the local authority and voluntary agencies can help staff emergency centres and provide practical assistance.
7. In all centres, it is important that attendees are registered and documented, with basic details passed to the casualty bureau when appropriate.

Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC): Lead Agency - Police

8. The function of a SuRC is to immediately provide survivors who do not require hospital treatment a place they can be met by responding agencies to obtain information and support and provide evidence and accounts of the incident to Police. In some incidents it may not be practicable to establish a SuRC immediately because of other more pressing activities such as lifesaving or removing the public from danger.
9. The SuRC should be situated between the inner and outer cordon to ensure security for the survivors.
10. The purpose of a Survivor Reception Centre is:
 - To collect information relevant to the investigation.
 - To provide immediate shelter for persons who have been directly involved in an emergency.
 - To allow documentation of the survivors.
 - To enable the identification of potential witnesses by the police.
 - To provide first aid to those in need of it and not requiring hospitalisation.

- To provide initial care and welfare support to survivors.
 - To organise onward travel where appropriate.
 - To provide information to survivors.
11. It is highly desirable that welfare staff from the local authority or voluntary organisations should be present to support the police in the provision of care and practical assistance to survivors in the SuRC.
 12. Within the SuRC persons should be provided with whatever psychological first aid is appropriate to the situation. This is likely to include providing calm and reassurance alongside practical support such as access to telephones to inform loved ones that they are safe and well and help with onward travel arrangements.
 13. The SuRC, although police activated, may be required for a protracted period, and should this occur, it could be handed over to the local authority to manage as a Rest Centre once police involvement has concluded.

Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC): Lead Agency - Police

14. Past emergencies have shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident, many people will travel to the scene in order to find family and friends that they believe to be involved.
15. If large numbers of people are converging on the scene, the police may decide that it is necessary to have a separate area where family and friends can gather to receive information as it becomes available.
16. The FFRC should be set up outside the outer cordon.
17. The purpose of a Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC) is:
 - To help reunite friends and relatives with survivors.
 - To provide a place for the Police to record missing persons' enquiries and to collect information that may aid their investigation.
 - To provide friends and relatives with a safe area to gather, away from media attention.
 - To provide friends and relatives with up-to-date and accurate information on the response arrangements that have been put in place.
 - To provide access to practical and emotional support to those friends and relatives affected.
18. Local authorities and the voluntary sector will have a key role in the providing for the immediate practical and emotional needs for friends and family members.
19. In the event of an aviation incident, airlines may set up a "Friends and Relatives Reception Centre" (FRRC) which serves a similar purpose. It will be staffed and supported by the airline industry with police support.
20. Both the main line Train Operating Companies and London Underground maintain Rail Incident Care Teams (RICT). RICTs are deployed to the various emergency reception centres, hospitals, etc. to which those in need of support would be taken or directed where they would form part of the multi-agency humanitarian response, working in partnership with police, health services and local authority teams.

Rest Centre (RC): Lead Agency - Local Authority

21. A Rest Centre serves as a place of safety for those who are uninjured and not directly affected by the incident but who have been evacuated from their home, work or other place or who are unable to return to that place after being away.
22. The purpose of a Rest Centre is:
 - To provide immediate shelter for persons who have been evacuated from an area or are otherwise in need of emergency accommodation following an incident.
 - To provide initial light refreshments for evacuees.
 - To enable details of evacuees to be maintained in the centre for reference.
 - To provide for the wellbeing of the evacuees and to offer support services and information on a wide range of welfare related subjects.
 - To provide evacuees and survivors with updated information about the incident and its possible effects upon them directly.
23. A Rest Centre is likely to be established further away from the incident site than a SuRC, in a building such as a sports centre, and may take up to 2-3 hours to set up. Local authorities maintain a list of suitable buildings to be used as Rest Centres although these may not always be available or be the most suitable building to use at the time of the emergency. In prolonged incidents, it is possible that evacuees will need to sleep overnight in the Rest Centre if they are unable to find alternative accommodation such as hotels or make their own arrangements to stay with family and friends.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC): Lead Agency - Local Authority

24. A HAC differs from Rest Centres or FFRCs in the respect that a HAC provides broader support over a longer period for all those affected whilst investigation and recovery operations are taking place. The HAC should remain open for as long its services are required. This is likely to be a number of weeks or possibly months.
25. A Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) would be set up with the following objectives:
 - Act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved individuals and families, survivors and impacted communities.
 - Enable individuals and families to gain as much information as is currently available about family members and friends involved in the incident.
 - Enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, in order to enhance the ability to identify loved ones quickly.
 - Offer access to a range of facilities that will allow individuals, families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs.
 - Provide a coherent multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that will minimise duplication.
26. The local authority is responsible for setting up and operating a HAC, following a request from the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) or Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG). This will include a HAC Management Group, whereby a range of other organisations (e.g. police, voluntary agencies, NHS, and private sector organisations) can coordinate the provision of information and support for survivors and their relatives in the HAC.
27. More details can be found in the [London Humanitarian Assistance Framework](#).

Community Assistance Centre (CAC): Lead Agency - Local Authority

28. The purpose of a Community Assistance Centre (CAC) is to provide advice and support to people affected by a major incident, and to support the recovery of the community in a local setting.
29. CACs may be considered particularly where a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) has not been activated. It may be appropriate particularly when:
 - When the impact is concentrated in a particular area, if a number of areas are affected several such centres may be considered.
 - People are affected significantly, and need advice and support, but the intensity of the impact is of a lower order (for example, there are not mass fatalities) and/or the number of people affected is smaller than would trigger an HAC.
30. Caution should be exercised before triggering both CACs and a HAC because of the potential for dilution of resources.
31. Establishing a CAC is a local authority responsibility, accessing such support as is needed from other responding organisations.
32. A CAC should be located in an appropriate publicly accessible building within easy reach of the affected people. It may be appropriate to transition from Rest Centres or SuRCs directly, as the response develops; or it may be sensible to identify an alternative building.
33. Besides the local authority, there are a number of agencies who may be appropriate to attend, depending on circumstances:
 - NHS staff, if health monitoring is needed.
 - Voluntary agencies and faith responders may need to attend to provide emotional support and care.
 - Insurance companies.
 - Benefits agency.
 - Registered social landlords, if social housing stock has been affected.
 - The Police if investigations are still ongoing.

Casualty Bureau: Lead Agency - Police

- Police may establish a Casualty Bureau. The objective of Casualty Bureau (CB) is to be an initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in a major emergency.
- In brief CB receives information from two sources
 - 1) The public who make a telephone or online report with details of persons they are unable to contact who may be involved in the incident.
 - 2) Police documentation teams at hospitals and reception centres where those involved are present, sends details of those persons to CB
- CB staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries.
- Where a match is made, appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.

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- Where injuries are fatal or serious, CB will inform the Senior Identification Manager for consideration of a family liaison officer deployment.
- The CB will not close until all enquiries have ended in regard to casualties, survivors and missing persons and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

Annex D – Terrorist incidents

1. Lead Authority: Police
2. In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.
3. For all known or suspected terrorist incidents all personnel should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices. Police will be responsible for checking rendezvous points (RVP), marshalling areas, Forward Command Points (FCP) and cordon points for suspicious objects.

Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU)

4. The VTU has been established to coordinate, at a HM Government level, support to citizens affected by terrorist attacks affecting British Citizens a home or overseas. The VTU web pages on GOV.UK contain information on where to seek advice and assistance following a terrorist attack. It also provides details of official helplines and support services available to victims, survivors, witnesses, family members, and all those affected.
5. Where the VTU responds to an incident, it is necessary for the work of the VTU to be closely coordinated with the work of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG).

Annex E – CBRN(e)

1. Lead Authority: Police supported by LFB and LAS

Introduction

2. An attack may involve the use of explosives to disperse the hazardous material (denoted by 'e' in 'CBRN(e)'). Terrorists may try to obtain toxic industrial chemicals or materials, such as pesticides - to use in a chemical device.
3. The impact of a CBRN device is significant, not only as a result of its activation, but also in the fear and panic that would be created within the public and media, and the considerable resources that would be required in the decontamination and restoration to normality following such an attack.
4. **C – Chemical** - Some form of chemical agent and a method of disseminating the material. The effects could range from: respiratory distress, blistering to the skin and in the worst case, death.
5. **B – Biological** - May involve the dispersal of bacteria, virus or toxins by a variety of methods including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a mechanical sprayer or the contamination of foodstuffs or environment. Effects of biological attacks may not be immediately apparent.
6. **R – Radiological** - An Improvised Explosive Device containing a quantity of radioactive material known as a "Dirty Bomb". The radioactive material is dispersed rendering the contaminated area potentially hazardous to health until a decontaminated. Alternatively, an unshielded radioactive source may be left in a public place potentially causing radiation sickness and the increased probability of developing cancer in later life.
7. **N – Nuclear** - The difficulty in obtaining nuclear material and the considerable scientific and engineering expertise required to create an improvised nuclear device, make this the least likely mode of attack. However, terrorists could potentially obtain a device from existing nuclear stockpiles.

Response

8. A LESLP response in line with the procedure laid out in this Document will be required for both pre and post activation of a suspected CBRN device. Police, Fire and Ambulance services, have personnel who have been trained and equipped to deal with the specialist response that is required for such an incident.
9. The main functions of emergency services and other agencies at a CBRN(e) incident are the same as those laid out in the Roles and Responsibilities section of the document

Substance Identification & Decontamination

10. Specific detail on the response from the Police, Fire and Ambulance services, which includes substance identification and casualty decontamination, can be found in the London CBRN(e) Response Framework and the JESIP CBRN(e) Joint Operating Principles.

Annex F – Mainline rail and TfL services

Railways – General

1. Lead Authority Police through British Transport Police
2. The emergency services all have policies and procedures for dealing with railway incidents. These should be followed by their personnel at each incident on or near the railway. Reference should also be made to the 'Rail Incidents: Guidance to the Emergency Services for Access to the Railway Infrastructure'¹.
3. Emergency service personnel should not go on or near the track unless accompanied by appropriately qualified staff from the rail infrastructure manager or operator.
4. The number of personnel working on or near the track should be kept to a minimum and all doing so must wear high-visibility clothing.
5. If people on the track are in direct and immediate danger and urgent action is required to preserve human life, emergency services personnel may go on to the track, but only as a last resort and after checking it is safe to do so - personnel must conduct a dynamic risk assessment. Be aware of the operation of automatic trains (Docklands Light Railway and some London Underground lines) in the area of the incident.
6. Emergency service personnel **must not under any circumstances**, enter running tunnels unless it has been confirmed that trains are stopped, and power is off.
7. The relevant control centre must be informed immediately that personnel are on the line and the reasons for doing so.
8. Any request for 'power off' should also include 'trains stopped' and include the area/location to be isolated. Merely having the power switched off may not stop all trains. Electrically powered trains may seek to 'coast' to the nearest station and diesel powered trains often run on the same track as electrically powered trains.
9. The request should be passed either from the emergency services' control rooms to the rail infrastructure control, or in person to an appropriately qualified staff on site. This same control or person will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

Investigation

10. British Transport Police will lead in railway incidents other than Terrorism.
11. The Office of Rail and Road and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch have statutory responsibilities to investigate incidents occurring on the rail and tram network. Their staff carry formal identification and must be allowed access through cordons. In addition, some evidence at railway incidents is perishable and access for technical staff to capture this must be facilitated. This will be managed through the BTP senior officer present at the site.

Mainline Railways

12. Network Rail is the lead authority for rail incidents on all mainline railways including those where London Overground (LO) and TfL Rail/Elizabeth Line trains (outside the

¹ Rail Incidents: Guidance to the Emergency Services for Access to the Railway Infrastructure, October 2021, available on ResilienceDirect (Network Rail File Store).

Central Operating Section – see below) operate and will provide liaison and assistance at the scene through its Rail Incident Officer (RIO).

13. The RIO is responsible for site safety and will maintain close liaison with the emergency services during an incident to ensure a safe system of work has been established and maintained.
14. Tactical and strategic management of the incident will be managed through the relevant Route Control (ROC).

Elizabeth Line Central Operating Section

15. The Elizabeth Line Central Operating Section (COS) runs from Westbourne Park sidings in the west, to Pudding Mill Lane tunnel portal and Abbey Wood sidings in the east and Rail for London Infrastructure (RFLI) is the lead authority for incidents that occur within this area.
16. The RFLI tactical response to an incident within the COS will be led by the Incident Response Manager (IRM) who will wear a RIO tabard to make themselves readily identifiable to other agencies and operate within the JESIP principles to set up a safe system of work. Strategic management will be provided by the Rail Incident Commander at the Route Control Centre (RCC).
17. All requests for track access, for trains to be stopped and for the overhead power lines to be switched off must be made to the RCC or via a member of staff on site. This same control or person will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

London Underground and other Light Rail Systems

18. The request for emergency service personnel to access the track should be passed in person to an appropriately qualified staff on site or in their absence from the emergency services' control rooms to the London Underground (LU), DLR or Tram control room. This same person or control will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.
19. Trams are an open access system so staff can go onto the track in an emergency, once they have ensured it is safe to do so.
20. The LU, DLR or Tram operator is responsible for site safety and will maintain close liaison with the emergency services during an incident to ensure a safe system of work has been established and maintained.
21. LU trains and infrastructure are operated completely separately to that of the mainline railways. All requests for trains to be stopped and/or power to be switched off must be made directly to London Underground following the existing agreed protocols.
22. The LU tactical response to an incident on their network will be led by the Network Incident Response Manager (NIRM). They are accompanied by a BTP medic officer and are transported in a police vehicle with a blue light capability. They will wear a Silver tabard to make themselves readily identifiable to other agencies and operate within the JESIP principles. They will assist the other commanders in achieving full situational awareness and a joint understanding of the specific risks involved in working on the underground network.
23. LU operates a dedicated Emergency Response Unit (ERU), staffed 24/7 and based at strategic locations across London. ERU teams are trained in all aspects of railway safety, infrastructure, rolling stock and casualty extraction and body recovery duties. At least one ERU team has a blue light response capability, provided by BTP drivers. They are

primarily a London Underground asset but may attend other railway related incidents, following an appropriate request to the LUCC. ERU can also respond to trams incidents.

24. LU also operates an Emergency Control Unit, which may be deployed to a major incident to support LU and other TfL businesses in incident management and subsequent site recovery.

Incident Care

25. Both the main line Train Operating Companies and London Underground maintain Rail Incident Care Teams (RICT). These teams are comprised of specially selected volunteers who have been trained in how to respond in the hours and days immediately following a major rail incident to the needs of those directly involved, their friends/family and those bereaved. RICTs are deployed to the various emergency reception centres, hospitals, etc. to which those in need of support would be taken or directed where they would form part of the multi-agency humanitarian response, working in partnership with police, health services and local authority teams.

Transport for London – Surface Transport

26. Transport for London can be contacted 24/7 through the Network Management Control Centre (NMCC) or for London Underground through the London Underground Control Centre (LUCC), who in turn will notify each other of the declaration of a major incident and initiate an appropriate response. The NMCC will also notify the operators who manage the other TfL Surface transport modes
27. The level and type of support available is based on its day-to-day operations, such as:

Professional	Physical	Welfare
Technical and engineering advice	Passenger transport vehicles	TfL Care Team
Construction operations	Engineering and plant equipment	
Road space and traffic management		
Rail infrastructure operation		

28. The London bus network is the largest public transport provider in London and likely the best means of evacuating or moving large numbers of people at short notice in an emergency situation. Command and control arrangements rest in TfL Surface Transport Network Management Control Centre (NMCC). Appropriate front line TfL staff would be coordinated through the NMCC to provide support from a transport perspective.

Surface Bronze (Operational) Commanders

29. The TfL On Site Bronze is a manager representing any affected TfL business units able to respond to requests for TfL assistance and is the liaison point for TfL and its contractors. The on-site Bronze will react to requests for assistance and represent TfL at Tactical Coordination meetings or at the Forward Command Point (FCP). If necessary, the on-site Bronze will provide the link between the incident, the Silver in the NMCC and

the appropriate TfL Control Centre. For Tram incidents the operator will be the lead on site.

Pan-London Transport Cell

30. Where an incident has pan-London implications, it may be necessary to coordinate activity across TfL and other transport providers. This is in addition to the normal liaison between the various TfL command structures. The Palestra Event Liaison Facility (PELF) may be activated as a Transport Cell to coordinate the response to the impacts across the transport network. This activity will be initiated through the TfL Gold commander or through a request from the Strategic Coordination Group.

Annex G – Air incident civil / military

Specific site hazards

1. A major air accident may produce a toxic environment at the scene and all services responding should be aware of the potential hazards and consider the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction whether there is a fire or not, due to the potential spread of toxic substances.
2. The London Fire Brigade, the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) or civilian Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) are all able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types.
3. The Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS) can provide the relevant health and safety information for military aircraft.
4. The RAF Centre for Aviation Medicine and the Institute of Naval Medicine can provide scientific advice and deploy an Environmental Health Technician if required.
5. This information can also be obtained via the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre at the National Marine Operations Centre (NMOC). They can fax hazard information to any emergency service on request.

Helicopters

Police helicopters

6. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has access to the National Police Air Service fully role-equipped helicopters available 24/7 over the Greater London area. Their aircraft have the following equipment:
 - Comprehensive radio communications, visual and thermal imaging - effective day and night.
 - Some aircraft have a searchlight ('nitesun') capability to illuminate a wide area.
 - Public address system ('skyshout') capable of broadcasting messages at a lower operating height; (Not routinely carried).
 - Encrypted video transmission to MPS and London Fire Brigade (LFB) control rooms and command vehicles. The MPS also hold a small number of mobile devices that are capable of receiving the transmission.
 - Digital stills camera.

Military helicopters

7. RAF support helicopters could be used to respond to civilian incidents if required.
8. Potential uses include; the evacuation of larger numbers of personnel including casualties, the transport of personnel where other methods of transportation are unsuitable due to weather or terrain, or movement of large objects including aircraft wreckage.
9. The use of support helicopters would be subject to MACA procedures and would depend on the availability of these helicopters.

10. Major incidents involving aircraft that occur within airfield boundaries will involve a local response based on either Civilian Aviation Authority (CAA) or Military Aviation Authority (MAA) direction depending on the ownership and operation/registration of the aircraft.

London Air Ambulance (LAA) – Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)

11. LAA is available to land at a predetermined location and provide at least one doctor and trained paramedic to the scene. The helicopter may be used to ferry additional doctors and resources to the scene. It is unlikely that the aircraft would be used for the conveyance of patients.
12. The decision to mobilise air ambulance assistance will be made by the LAS in conjunction with the other emergency services to ensure a coordinated approach to all local air traffic including other emergency services and/or military services. Any requests for the air ambulance should be directed to the ambulance tactical commander.
13. LAA doctors are an integral part in the mass casualty scenario and will support even without the helicopter.

HM Coastguard Search and Rescue helicopters

14. HM Coastguard SAR helicopters may also be called upon to assist in marine or land based Search & Rescue incidents in the London area as well as patient transfer and movement of armed Police assets. Coastguard helicopters are equipped to winch people from the water or from vessels and can carry seated and stretcher casualties. They are fitted with infrared equipment to assist location of casualties in the water in poor visibility and at night.
15. HM Coastguard helicopters are tasked by HM Coastguard through the UK Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC), which is part of HM Coastguard and located within their Joint Rescue Coordination Centre. Any of the emergency services may request a helicopter asset through ARCC. In London any police request will be made by NPAS.

Temporary helipads

16. Temporary helipads might need to be identified with consideration for:
 - safety of crew and aircraft from obstructions such as wires, unit masts and unsuitable terrain;
 - safety from harmful chemical release, fire/smoke;
 - access to vehicle;
 - disturbance of debris/evidence or disruption by excessive noise.

Emergency flying restrictions

17. The police tactical commander may request the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to impose temporary flying restrictions over the scene. This may be required when the safety of those in the air or on the ground would be otherwise compromised. The National Police Air Service (NPAS) is available 24/7 for advice and guidance.

Annex H – River Thames Incidents

1. Lead Authority: HM Coastguard

Introduction

2. Any incident on the River Thames could see an impact on more than one local authority on either side of the river.
3. This is a fast flowing environment, where the scene of incident can change and move up or down river quite quickly. This could inevitably take the incident into neighbouring local authority areas.
4. HM Coastguard, Port of London Authority, RNLI, Metropolitan Police Marine Policing Unit, London Fire Brigade, Environment Agency have individual statutory responsibilities or functions on the river.
5. The River itself will affect the response to any river incident and people unfamiliar with a maritime environment may not appreciate its power and danger.
 - The Thames has a tidal rise and fall of about 7 metres twice a day,
 - Regularly flows at a speed of 6 MPH.
 - Strong currents and underflows exist along the river, especially under bridges, where casualties can get drawn underwater and resurface some distance away.
 - Water temperature, underwater hazards, moving platforms and unstable footing are additional risks, frequently underestimated.
6. Appropriate Casualty Landing Points (CLPs) will be nominated by HM Coastguard (HMCG) after discussion with other relevant organisations.

Tidal River Thames (Canvey Island to Teddington Lock)

7. The Port of London Authority is the authority with responsibility for the River Thames.
8. Responsible for; River Navigation and Safety, Planning Consultation and Technical Expertise, Promoting the River and Environmental Stewardship.
9. Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Control Centres operate at Woolwich and Gravesend.

Non-tidal River Thames (above Teddington Lock)

10. Statutory Authority responsible for river and daily operations: The Environment Agency (EA)

Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) incidents on the Thames

HM Coastguard

11. Communications on the Tidal Thames will be on both Airwave and VHF (for navigation and safety).
12. HM Coastguard are located in a joint Control Centre with the Port of London Authority (PLA).

13. HMCG deploy and coordinate RNLI, HMCG Helicopters, RNLI lifeboats, Marine Policing Unit, LFB vessels, other craft or vessels as appropriate. For mud or cliff rescues, HMCG deploy their own Coastal Rescue Teams (CRT) around the coast, but within London this function is carried out by London Fire Brigade.
14. HMCG London is part of a national network of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres and is supported by the Joint Rescue Coordination at Fareham.

RNLI Lifeboats – deployed by HM Coastguard

15. The RNLI have four stations covering London; three permanently staffed and available 24/7 at Gravesend, Tower and Chiswick; with the fourth station at Teddington operated by volunteers on a call out basis.
16. The volunteer lifeboat at Teddington may be suitable for deployment to incidents above Teddington Lock (non-tidal Thames). The RNLI can only be deployed by HMCG.

Metropolitan Police Marine Policing Unit

17. The Marine Police Unit (MPU) is based at Wapping providing 24/7 capability equipped with a variety of craft for deployment on tidal and non-tidal River Thames and other waterways and bodies of water. The MPU also has an underwater search team.

London Fire Brigade

18. The London Fire Brigade (LFB) is based at Lambeth Pier providing 24/7 capability equipped with a craft suitable for fire-fighting and capable of a variety of water-related responses. All front line appliances are equipped with water rescue equipment including throw lines and hose inflation kits, with staff trained to coordinate a bankside rescue. In addition, LFB has a number of Fire Rescue Units strategically located across London, equipped with Emergency Rescue Boats (ERB) and mud paths. These vessels are crewed by specialist swift water rescue staff.
19. LFB can also provide assets to respond to incidents on other waterways or bodies of water, including the non-tidal River Thames.

General

Rendezvous Point (RVP)

20. A river based incident may require RVPs on both sides of the river due to difficulty of access or lack of river crossings.

Cordons

21. A river based cordon is difficult to implement, but the PLA are able to create river closures and support them by the presence of PLA workboats and safety broadcasts over the VHF radio.
22. A land based cordon may be implemented to support a function e.g. close a bridge overlooking an incident, close a riverbank to secure access, close a riverside area to facilitate safe landing of casualties.

On Scene Coordinator (OSC)

23. HMCG have legal authority to appoint an appropriate person to take on this role on their behalf. Even though the appointed OSC may be from another organisation they will carry out this responsibility under the directions of HMCG. The Port of London Authority can, if required, provide a liaison officer from their Harbour Masters Department who will have the knowledge of the different organisations and their roles on the river.

Risk Assessment

24. Whilst HMCG coordinate all Maritime SAR, each organisation retains responsibility for the Health and Safety and working practices of their own personnel.

Assistance to other vessels

25. Under Maritime Law the master of a vessel has a duty to respond and assist any vessel or person in distress – this obligation must be considered when taking decisions.

Annex I – Flooding: Fluvial, Tidal, Surface Water and Ground Water

1. Lead: Local Authority or Environment Agency

Introduction

2. Flooding is becoming an increasingly common event. It could be localised or occur simultaneously at locations across London, to amount to a series of major incidents, which may be short term or protracted.
3. The [Flood rescue concept of operations](#) sets out the framework for enhancing the capability and national co-ordination of flood rescue in England.

Types of Flooding

4. There are several distinct types of flooding that all impact London:
 - **Fluvial Flooding:** Flooding from a main river or ordinary watercourse. This typically occurs due to a rise in the water level, blockage or overtopping of a defence which overflows onto surrounding land.


Rivers are classified by the Environment Agency as either main rivers or ordinary watercourses. The Environment Agency is responsible for the flood prevention measures on main rivers. Ordinary watercourses are the responsibility of various bodies such as local authorities and other landowners.
 - **Tidal Flooding:** Tidal flooding results from an incoming tide coming from the sea, raising river levels above the level of defences or from a breach in defences. The river Thames in London is tidal.
 - **Surface Water Flooding:** Surface water flooding occurs where rainfall exceeds natural and highway drainage capacity and therefore lies or flows over the ground instead. Surface water flooding can occur very quickly with little or no warning.
 - **Ground Water Flooding:** Flooding caused by a rise in the water table. Water may rise up through the ground from within the rock or soil. South East London, due to its geology, is more vulnerable to this type of flooding.
 - **Other types of Flooding:** Flooding may also occur from man-made sources such as water main bursts or from reservoir failure.

Flood Forecasting

- The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing flood alerts and warnings for fluvial, tidal and in some cases groundwater flooding.

	FLOOD ALERT	PREPARE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare a bag that includes medicines and insurance documents • Visit flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk
	FLOOD WARNING	ACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turn off gas, water and electricity • Move things upstairs or to safety • Move family, pets and car to safety
	SEVERE FLOOD WARNING	SURVIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call 999 if in immediate danger • Follow advice from emergency services • Keep yourself and your family safe

- Further information can be obtained by calling Floodline on 0845 988 1188 or checking the live flood warning map <https://flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk/warnings>
- The **Met Office** issues warnings of severe weather, which give warning of the possibility of flooding from other sources.
- The Flood Forecasting Centre issues [Flood Guidance Statements](#) which present an overview of flood risk for across five days identifying possible severe weather, which could cause flooding and significant disruption. The below matrix is used to indicate forecast information. **Significant** or **severe** impact forecasts triggers preparation and or response actions as indicated in [London's Strategic Flood Response Framework](#).



- Due to the nature of London's flood risk it is imperative that preparation actions such as clearing trash screens or gullies to minimise the impact of blockages are taken on forecast information and are impact driven even if the likelihood of flooding is low.

Roles and responsibilities

The following are in addition to the generic roles and responsibilities mentioned throughout this document:

Police

- In the event of the agreed procedures for warning and informing communities at risk not being effective, then, where practicable, assistance will be given.

London Fire Brigade

11. The LFB will provide assistance with rescue from flooded environments, pumping operations, flood mitigation, warning and informing communities at risk.
12. The LFB hold a range of flood capabilities including rescue boats, pumps including high volume pumping and specialist flood mitigation equipment.

London Ambulance Service

13. The LAS may assist with the evacuation of vulnerable persons and supporting the local authority on a clinical needs basis. Whilst the LAS does not possess any boats, they have a number of water rescue sleds and staff trained to work on boats and in water environments.

Local Authority

14. Local Authorities lead for local flood risks as defined by the Flood and Water Management Act. These include surface water and groundwater.
15. Operating, monitoring and inspecting Local Authority owned assets within watercourses, including ensuring trash screens are clear to minimise the risk of potential blockages.
16. Provision of general advice and information in support of the Environment Agency to the public on flood prevention measures and environmental health issues, including encouraging those at potential risk of flooding to sign up to the Environment Agency's flood alert scheme.
17. Local authorities may also provide further assistance to the public if resources permit, e.g. drying-out facilities or potential provision of flooding mitigation measures.
18. Co-ordination of the recovery phase following a flooding incident.

Environment Agency (EA)

19. The EA will lead the response to fluvial (river) and tidal (Thames) flooding. If resources allow the EA will support local authorities and others in the response to surface water, ground water and other types flooding as well.
20. Provide a flood warning service for fluvial, tidal and in some areas ground water flooding.
21. Operating, monitoring and inspecting flood defences, including ensuring trash screens on main rivers are clear to minimise blockages.
22. Helping partners to pump flood water away from flooded areas where resources allow.
23. Alongside the Met Office helps to escalate the partnership multi-agency preparation and response by triggering teleconferences on certain forecasts.

Annex J – Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)

1. Lead Authority: The Military will support the emergency service or organisation they are assisting. For example, in the event of:
 - Flooding - Local Authority
 - Casualty evacuation - Ambulance Service
 - Building collapse - Fire and Rescue Service
 - Cordon maintenance - Police Service

References

2. [Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience. Fourth Edition, November 2021.](#)
3. [London Strategic Coordination Protocol.](#)

Definition

4. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA): Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event.

Policy

5. The UK Government has developed, and significantly improved, the nation's civil response capability following a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st Century.
6. Civil Authorities routinely take the lead in planning for, and responding to, emergencies. Under MACA, Defence plays a supporting role by providing specialist capabilities and more generalist personnel support when: the civil authorities' capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident; directed to do so; or preparing for major national events.
7. Military support cannot be guaranteed and will be considered against defence commitments.
8. Recent significant MACA events include:
 - a. Providing widespread and general support during flooding events across the UK on a number of occasions over the last decade.
 - b. Providing security for large-scale, pre-planned events of international and national significance, including the London Olympic Games (2012), the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow (2014) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in South Wales (2014) and the G7 Summit in Cornwall (2021).
 - c. Assisting UK citizens stranded overseas by the Icelandic ash cloud in 2010.
 - d. Support in response to events not necessarily defined as a risk in the National Risk Assessment, but where military support is appropriate, such as providing specialist assistance following the collapse of Didcot Power Station in 2016 and the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017.

- e. Support to NHS England and NHS Improvement (London), London Ambulance Service, London Resilience Group, Local Authorities, and Other Government Departments during COVID-19 (2020-2021).

Four policy criteria guide the provision of MACA

9. MACA may be provided where:

- There is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
- Other options, including mutual aid, commercial alternatives and the voluntary sector have been discounted; and either
- The civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
- The civil authority has all or some capability or capacity, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

10. Under exceptional circumstances Defence ministers can choose to temporarily waive these criteria. This may happen when there are major events of national and international importance, or an event that is catastrophic, or potentially so, in nature.

Authority to deploy

11. Military resources are not specifically set aside for assisting in an emergency, so any assistance will depend on what assets are available at the time. Involvement by the military chain-of-command and Defence Ministerial approval is necessary for assets to be deployed.

12. Armed Forces support must always be at the specific request of the Civil Authorities and in almost all circumstances requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. The General Officer Commanding London District has the authority to deploy personnel under his command immediately without reference to higher command if they can be immediately helpful in alleviating distress and saving lives and property.

Reaction to an 'Immediate Impact' Emergency

13. For an 'immediate impact' event, HQ London District at Horse Guards, Whitehall, will task one of the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs) to attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), if formed, and will provide a single point of contact for Military Aid requests (except Special Forces). All requests should be made through the Chair of the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG).

14. Some niche capabilities, such as engineers, aviation, and explosive ordnance disposal, are already used and their tasking and capabilities are well understood by the Metropolitan Police Service and do not require Ministerial Approval.

General Capabilities

15. Able to provide the military command, control and communications based on HQ LONDIST enabling a 24/7 capability, in order to supervise and carry out tasks in support of and in co-ordination with the Emergency Services and Local Authorities.

16. Able to be logistically self-supporting.

17. Able to be flexible and responsive but operate only within own capabilities.
18. Personnel for unarmed general duties might be made through HQ LONDIST for the crisis and consequence management phases of a major 'immediate impact' emergency.
19. These tasks might include:
 - Reconnaissance. Deployment of small command teams to assist the Emergency Services in determining the extent of, and monitoring, an incident.
 - Public Control. Assistance to MPS in controlling access and crowd management, but short of involvement in maintenance of 'public order' which remains a police responsibility.
 - Evacuation. Assist the police in the control or channelling of large numbers of public in the incident area.
 - Route Guidance. Identification and securing of safe routes around the incident area.
 - Cordons. Provision of personnel for cordons. A police presence would be expected perhaps on a ratio of 1:5 soldiers.
 - Access Control. Assisting police control at RV/access points. Provide marshals to control or channel large numbers of people in particular at RVs and access points.
 - Media Handling. Assist in handling the media and other non-governmental agencies.
 - Stores Protection and Distribution. Assist in protecting and transporting stores and supplies including medicines.
 - Key Installations. Supporting the police to prevent looting and theft, particularly if key installations are directly affected by the incident.
 - Mass Casualties. Personnel may be required to give limited emergency first aid, stretcher evacuation, aid to walking wounded, locating, securing and marking bodies or body parts and support to the medical services to enable access and evacuation.
 - Engineering Tasks. The civil and local authorities will retain the lead on any civil engineering tasks but may be supported by Royal Engineer assets if available. Troops may be tasked to provide assistance with site search and safety checks, provision of flood or water defences and the use of boats and assistance with the removal of debris from areas where people might be trapped or where key facilities are buried.
 - Temporary Accommodation. Secure, organise, and control emergency or temporary accommodation.
 - Water and Feeding Points. In addition to integral catering and water, support troops may be asked to man and control both feeding points and water points at the site and assist with supply of food to areas of the incident.
 - Rest Centres. Assist Local Authorities manage premises designated for temporary accommodation for evacuees.
 - The provision of a Military Assessment Team – MAT. A team of 1 - 4 specialists specific to the task required. Provided at no cost for a period of usually 1-3 days. Dependant on the urgency of the request, a MAT can be provided at very short notice if necessary.
 - Planning capacity, endurance and C2 and operational management are key capabilities that we can provide to other agencies.
20. Troops will always deploy as a self-contained formed body under command of an Officer or Non-Commissioned-Officer (NCO) throughout the period of military involvement. They

will initially report to and work under the direction of the emergency services' Operational Commander. A Military Liaison Officer (MLO) will also deploy as the military point of contact at Operational, Tactical and Strategic levels.

21. After the immediate response to an incident, it is less likely that the military would be made available during the Consequence and Recovery phase of an emergency. However, the same caveats would apply should the Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) seek support.

Reaction to a 'Rising Tide' Emergency

22. On the outset of a 'rising tide' emergency, military advice should be sought from HQ London District through the JRLOs. While informal discussion and contingency planning may take place at a local level, the Civil Authority must submit a formal request, through the Home Office to the MOD for military aid before the chain-of-command will act.
23. Requests for MACA support should be submitted in good time and should articulate clearly not only the effect required, but also why military resources are needed to achieve it.

Costs

24. HM Treasury rules direct that government departments must charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks and that departments must not profit from activity carried out on behalf of another department. With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded within the MOD budget and is conducted on a repayment basis.
25. There are 3 charging levels. These are:

Full costs. Full costs cover both direct and indirect expenditure incurred in providing the assistance, including basic pay, allowances of the personnel involved and marginal costs expenditure. Full costs are likely to be recovered in the following circumstances.

- When there are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support; regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.
- Where the civil authorities can make alternative arrangements (for example, mutual aid) but have not done so.
- Where the civil authority charges for the service they are providing (through Defence) or have an additional budget allocation for the overall task.
- Where support is non-emergency, planned or routine support, unless it is judged there is a Defence benefit to Defence which offsets the cost.

Marginal costs. Marginal costs are costs for military activity that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This includes: travel; subsistence; fuel; the cancellation of contracts as a result of Defence conducting MACA tasks; mobilisation bounty for Reserve Forces; and any similar expenditure. Marginal costs may be applied when:

- a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities and has a direct benefit to the MOD;
- a task can be combined with an action that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example, when a MACA task provides Defence-related training for our Armed Forces); and
- responding to an emergency, the strategic coordinating group has been established.

Zero cost. Costs may be waived when:

- there is an imminent threat to life;
- there is a need to alleviate distress;
- there is a need to protect significant property;
- Defence deploys a military liaison capability and/or a military assessment team; or
- there are other exceptional circumstances.

In all other circumstances, the decision to waive costs is taken by ministers.

26. The charging policy may change during a MACA operation. Marginal costs are likely to be applied in the early, dynamic stages of a response to a disruptive challenge, increasing to full costs levied during the recovery phase due to protracted Defence involvement and the resulting impact on MOD primary output. When it is in the national interest, Defence ministers may agree to reduce or waive costs.

Annex K – Safety

1. In the event of a major incident, a wide range of both physical, psychological and safety hazards may be faced by both the public and the blue light service responders; all of which need to be managed appropriately if the safety of staff and the public is not to be put at unacceptable risk.
2. All agencies responding to an incident need to quickly identify and manage hazards during the initial incident response and subsequent investigation and recovery stages. Where an agency identifies a risk that could impact other responders, this should be shared as appropriate.
3. The responsibility for health and safety of staff at a major incident rests with each agency respectively but, should be coordinated through the strategic commander.
4. An initial scene assessment (dynamic risk assessment as part of the Joint Decision Model) will need to be undertaken in an attempt to identify any immediate potential hazards to staff that may be expected to work at the scene/s.

Incident Safety Advisory Cell

5. The incident safety advisory cell should comprise relevant multi-agency operational practitioners, health, safety and medical professionals, and scientific advisers. The purpose of this group is to ensure the continuity of hazard identification and manage risk control measures across agencies. Professional collaboration ensures the effective use of safety and health expertise and resources.
6. The incident safety advisory cell should:
 - Set the strategy for safety.
 - Inform the tactical decision-making process, providing timely and consistent safety-critical strategy, information and instruction to all those affected or dealing with the incident.
 - Implement the operational plan and support the development of safety options to support informed interagency operational decision-making.
 - Coordinate an oversight of safety and health advice/support.
 - Advise on the incident hazard profile, assess/monitor hazards and activity, and support the recovery and clean-up. This includes:
 - hazard-profiling of the scene
 - supporting the development of incident risk assessments and management of hazards including safe systems of work
 - provision of pragmatic safety advice for what can often be a dynamic changing scenario and environment
 - post-event debriefing of staff and structured organisational learning

Fire Brigade Scientific Advisor

7. The role of the London Fire Brigade's Scientific Advisor is to provide relevant scientific and technical help to the fire brigade that will allow them (and the other emergency services) to resolve CBRN and Hazmat incidents in a rapid and safe manner with minimal risk to their personnel, the public, or the environment.

Annex L – Industrial Incidents

Factories and other industrial sites

1. Some locations, such as factories and other industrial sites, have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive, environmentally hazardous or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (e.g. flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials.

Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) sites

2. For some industrial sites specific emergency plans are maintained under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 2015². The Regulations apply mainly to the chemical and petrochemical industries, fuel storage and distribution, and businesses that:
 - Store fuels, including natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).
 - Have large warehouses or distribution facilities.
 - Manufacture and store toxic, flammable, or explosive materials.
3. In the context of COMAH incidents, the term 'Major Accident' is used by those agencies involved and should not be confused with the term 'Major Incident'.
4. A '**Major Accident**' means an occurrence such as a fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment to which the COMAH Regulations apply, and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment (whether immediate or delayed) inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.
5. For upper tier³ COMAH establishments in London, a specific External Emergency Plan is maintained for each establishment by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Relevant emergency response organisations also maintain their own plans for responding to COMAH Major Accidents.
6. In the event of a Major Accident the relevant COMAH External Emergency Plan should be activated. Copies of COMAH External Emergency Plans are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Plans are maintained by the London Resilience Group and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.
7. Main hazards vary depending upon the COMAH establishment but may include:
 - Toxic release (public health and environmental hazards)
 - Flammable release including unignited major spillage, bund pool fire, flash fire, explosion, Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE), with potential for thermal radiation effects from fire/explosion in a wide area around the site
 - Blast damage including damage to property
 - Contamination of the environment (ground, water, air) including a Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE) as a result of spillage / toxic release and/or fire water run-off
 - Public health and environmental effects from a smoke plume

² <https://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/>.

³ Upper tier means 'an establishment where a dangerous substance is present in a quantity equal to or in excess of the quantity specified in the COMAH Regulations.'

8. The COMAH Regulations are enforced by competent authorities. The competent authorities for sites in London are the Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency. The HSE and EA will need access to such locations following Major Accidents and may need to gather evidence.

Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) (gas pipelines):

9. There are approximately 350 km of Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) in London operating at between 7 bar to 70 bar pressure. They all carry stented and unstented natural gas.
10. These high-pressure pipelines are subject to the Pipelines Safety Regulations (1996)⁴. Under the PSR Regulations a specific London Major Accident Hazards Pipelines (MAHP) Emergency Plan is maintained by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Copies of the PSR MAHP Emergency Plan are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Plan is maintained by the London Resilience Group and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.
11. The MAHP Emergency Plan will be activated when it becomes known that a gas operator's pipeline has failed, or is likely to fail to a degree that warrants the activation and implementation of the relevant operators emergency plan for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines.
12. A major incident that requires the implementation of the MAHP Emergency Plan is likely to:
 - Affect a large number of people.
 - Cause significant public disruption.
 - Result in many injuries.
 - Cause major environmental damage.
 - Require a significant response from many agencies.
13. Safety Advice for First Responders:
 - Must approach location upwind with caution.
 - Implement a minimum of a 750m cordon, unless or until advised otherwise by the pipeline operator and a dynamic risk assessment has undertaken.
 - Gather incident information from pipeline operatives/ representatives if present.
 - Obtain and share other responders the latest weather forecast.
 - Responders should implement a restricted/hazard zone and cover the surrounding risks if any of the following indicators are present or reported:
 - Visible indicators: Fire and/or explosion, debris
 - Audible indicators: Hissing/roaring, explosion
 - If the smell is coming from a pipeline, there is the potential for ignition/explosion. However, the smell is detectable at low concentrations and is not on its own a good indicator of the nature of incident.

⁴ <https://www.hse.gov.uk/pipelines/index.htm>

Warning: Escaping gas may produce harmful noise levels. Responders must be made aware that standard issue hearing protection may not afford adequate protection.

- Contact the Duty Manager on the National Gas emergency immediately on 0800 111 999
- Network operator attendance can be accelerated via police escort – refer to Operation Bunsen.

14. The PSR pipelines in London are owned and operated by:

- National Grid
- Southern Gas Network
- Enfield Energy
- Barking Power Ltd
- Cadent Gas

Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019:

15. REPPIR 2019⁵ are concerned with preparedness for radiation emergencies. The Regulations concern premises where work with ionising radiation is carried out e.g. licensed nuclear sites, hospitals, universities, ports, airports, factories. The Regulations do not apply to transport by road, rail, air, sea or inland waterway.
16. The Regulations establish a framework of preparedness measures to ensure that arrangements are in place to effectively respond to that emergency, both on the site of the emergency situation and off-site where members of the public might be affected. The Regulations ensure that members of the public are provided with information, both before and during an emergency, so that they are properly informed and prepared, in advance, about what they need to do in the unlikely event of a radiation emergency occurring.
17. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the regulator for Licensed Nuclear Sites, authorised defence sites, nuclear new build sites and nuclear warship sites. As of 31st March 2021 there are none of these located in Greater London and there were no known arrangements for nuclear powered vessels to berth in London. Should any such powered vessel berth in London in the future, responsibility for any radiation emergency will be undertaken by the Ministry of Defence.
18. Under the REPPIR Regulations a specific London REPPIR Framework is maintained by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Copies of the REPPIR Framework are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Framework is maintained by the London Resilience Group and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.
19. The London REPPIR Framework sets out the arrangements for the production, agreement and dissemination of public information. It does not detail the operational response to manage the wider consequences of a radiation emergency.
20. The London Resilience Communication Group Framework should be read and used in conjunction with the REPPIR Framework to assist with identifying the audience and what their needs are with regards to communications about the incident.

⁵ <https://www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/reppir.htm>

Annex M – Other assistance

Voluntary Sector

1. The London Voluntary Sector are able to provide both general and specialist support to the emergency services, local authorities, health and other organisations as well as the public in a number of generic areas.
2. These elements of support may be requested as required by more than one agency at any time. It is anticipated that at times of particularly high demand, the London Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) may seek to determine priorities. However, this does not imply that the emergency services or other agencies should not make enquiries of any part of Voluntary Sector for appropriate resources as required.
3. The London Resilience Partnership, [Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document](#) is the core document that indicates which Voluntary Organisations may be able to provide assistance at the scene of a Major Incident, close by (i.e. Rest Centre, Survivor Reception Centre or Friends and Relatives Reception Centre) or elsewhere. This document lists various specialist services that are available from voluntary organisations, described generically as:
 - Welfare
 - Psychosocial Aftercare
 - Spiritual care & religious services
 - Medical Support
 - Search & Rescue
 - Transport & Escort
 - Communications
 - Documentation/Administration
 - Financial services; and
 - Equipment & resources available
4. Whilst it is anticipated that the emergency services and other organisations will seek assistance from the Voluntary Sector, it should not assume that the response will necessarily be provided free of charge. Organisations should be aware of the funding arrangements for each organisation. These can be found in the London Resilience Partnership Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document.

Utility companies

5. The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be coordinated by police in the first instance.
6. They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.

Annex N – London Resilience Partnership Frameworks

This annex provides a list of the London Resilience Partnership frameworks and guidance documents. The suite of documents is available on the London Prepared website www.londonprepared.gov.uk and on the ResilienceDirect (RD) extranet. Due to security considerations, some documents are classified as OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE and only available on ResilienceDirect or via Partnership organisation resilience teams.

Generic capability documents

1. Strategic Coordination Protocol
2. London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Principles.
3. London Resilience Communication Group Framework (only available on RD)
4. London Recovery Framework
5. Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document
6. London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) Arrangements (only available on RD)

Specific capability documents

7. CBRN(e) Response Framework (only available on RD)
8. Excess Deaths Framework
9. Humanitarian Assistance Framework
10. Mass Casualty Framework
11. Mass Evacuation Framework
12. Mass Fatalities Framework
13. Mass Shelter Framework
14. Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Arrangements (only available on RD)
15. Structural Collapse, Site Management and Clearance Framework

Risk specific documents

16. Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Emergency Plans (only available on RD)
17. Cyber Incident Response Framework
18. Drought Response Framework
19. Pandemic Influenza Framework
20. Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) Emergency Plan (only available on RD)
21. Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) Emergency Plan (only available on RD)
22. Severe Weather and Natural Hazards Framework
23. Strategic Flood Response Framework

Service disruption specific documents

24. Disruption to Telecommunications for Responders Plan (only available on RD)
25. Fuel Disruption Protocol (only available on RD)
26. Power Supply Disruption Framework
27. Water Supply Disruption Framework

Annex O – On-Scene Coordination Meeting Template Agenda

This agenda is intended as a guide for on-scene coordination meetings and should be adapted to the specific incident and circumstances presented.

The purpose of the meeting is to support the JESIP principles to co-locate, communicate, co-ordinate, jointly understand risk, and achieve shared situational awareness.

AGENDA

1. Introductions (by exception and only where deemed necessary)
2. Any urgent business
 - a. Confirmation of decisions on urgent business
 - b. Adjourn as necessary to action urgent business
3. Gather information and intelligence
(The order of sub-points a, b, and c may vary depending on the stage of the incident)
 - a. METHANE report – briefing by lead response organisation
 - b. Additional updates / new information from those present
 - c. Updates on previous actions and from any sub-groups
4. Assess threats and risks (from METHANE / any additional raised by those present)
5. Develop a working strategy
 - a. Consider powers, policies and procedures
 - b. Identify and evaluate options and contingencies
 - c. Confirm priorities, decisions, and agree actions to be taken
6. Information and advice to members of the public (at / around the incident scene)
7. Agree next meeting time and if any additional representatives are required

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LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities, and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.